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Glenn G. Morris*
INTRODUCTION
"Veil-piercing" is a term used to refer to a court's refusal to give
legal effect to the normally separate legal personality of a corporation.
Veil-piercing is most commonly used as a justification for imposing
personal liability on corporate shareholders for corporate debts (contrary
to the normal rule of limited liability), but it is a flexible doctrine that
can be used in any situation in which the separate personality of the
corporation appears to be blocking a just result. The doctrine is so
flexible, in fact, that it seldom offers any real guidance about how a
given dispute should be resolved. The black letter law consists of a set
of vague and inconsistent platitudes that are adaptable to virtually any
situation. By emphasizing one platitude rather than another, a court can
either respect or reject a corporation's separate personality, depending
on the result that the court considers to be fair, without really explaining
what it is doing, and why.
Faced with this type of law, most academic writing on veil-piercing
follows essentially the same format. It first criticizes existing doctrine
as conclusory, vacuous and "enveloped in the mists of metaphor,"' and
it then offers an explanation of what is "really" going on, behind all
the conclusory metaphors.' Most writers seem to agree that the existing
doctrine is useless, whether as a description of what actually does happen
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I. The "mists of metaphor" description originated in a 1926 decision by Judge
Benjamin Cardozo, Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61
(1926). Harry Henn and John Alexander have listed the various metaphors as follows:
"mere adjunct," "agent,'' "alias," "alter ego," "alter idem," "arm," "blind," "branch,"
"cloak," "coat," "corporate double." "cover," "creature," "curious reminescence,"
"delusion," ''department," "dry shell," "dummy," "fiction," ''form," "formality,"
"fraud on the law," "instrumentality," "mouthpiece," "name," "nominal identity,"
"phrase," "puppet," "screen,' ''sham," "simulacrum,'' "snare," "stooge," "subter.
fuge," and "tool." H. Henn & J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations 344 n.2 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,, 52 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 89 (1985); Clark, The Duties of a Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 505, 540-53 (1977); Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 979
(1971); Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 Mich. L. Rev.
597 (1936).
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in real cases, or as a prescription of what should.' Yet regardless of
their varying explanations of the actual results that they see 4 most
commentators also seem to share the faith that what actually does happen
in these cases is, for the most part,' what ought to happen. 6
3. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 89 (1985) (.'Piercing' seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare,
severe, and unprincipled. There is a consensus that the whole area of limited liability,
and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most confusing in corporate
law."); Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 979, 979-82 (1971) (characterizing
entity-based corporate veil analysis as fallacious, "at best a make-weight and at worst
conclusion-oriented"); Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34
Mich. L. Rev. 597, 598 (1936) (whether a corporation's entity status is to be respected
is "not a real issue at all but merely a fancied one ... it serves as a facile rationalization").
4. Some, including this article, use traditional forms of legal analysis to point out
differences based on recognized legal categories, such as contracts, torts and statutory
interpretation. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 979 (1971); Latty, The
Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 597 (1936). Others
use- economic theory. Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. Chi. L. Rev. 89 (1985); Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbill, An Economic Analysis of
Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. Toronto L.J. 117 (1980); Posner, The Rights
of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 499 (1976). One author mixes
history and economics, though in this case to criticize part of the limited liability doctrine.
Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. Corp. L. 573 (1986). Another
explains veil-piercing as an extension of normal creditor protection law. Clark, The Duties
of a Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 505, 540-53 (1977). Still another
considers veil-piercing to be a manifestation of "enterprise entity" theory, the theory that
courts look through the formal structure of a business organization to the "reality" of
its underlying enterprise. Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 343
(1947).
S. The two notable exceptions to this general sense of satisfaction arise in the area
of tort claims, where some question the general recognition of limited liability, and in
claims against affiliated corporations, where some believe the separate identities of the
affiliated corporations ought to be disregarded in favor of some sort of larger enterprise
liability theory. For an argument against the recognition of limited liability as to some
or all tort claimants, see, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879 (1991) (arguing for pro rata shareholder
liability); Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Subst-
ances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689, 716-17 (1985) (arguing
for liability for'knowable tort risks); Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for
the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 Yale L.J. 1190 (1967) (proposing personal liability
or mandatory insurance for tort obligations of closely-held corporations). On the question
of veil-piercing in affiliated corporate groups, see, e.g., Blumberg, Limited Liability and
Corporate Groups, It J. Corp. L. 573 (1986) (limited liability within affiliated group
characterized as historical accident, needing reexamination on policy grounds); Landers,
A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 589 (1975) (proposing restrictions on recognition of separate entity status
of affiliated corporations); Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations,
43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 499 (1976) (rejecting Landers' argument and favoring traditional
recognition of separate corporate status, as means of facilitating efficient bargaining about
credit risks); Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy,
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
This article will be true to the traditional format. The black letter
law of veil-piercing will first be described and criticized, and then the
actual outcomes in veil-piercing cases will be organized and explained
by reference to various underlying issues that seem to influence what
the courts actually do, as distinguished from what they say. Unlike most
earlier articles that have done similar things, however, this article will
not base its conclusions on selected cases from various states, but on
all of the decisions on the subject that have been reported in a single
state, Louisiana, since 1944. 7
The single-state focus of this article should be useful to judges and
practitioners in Louisiana. But it should also help overcome one of the
weaknesses in much of the writing in this field: a lack of empirical
support for the decisional patterns that authors say they see when they
examine this area of the law. The sheer number of reported veil-piercing
cases has been so overwhelming that commentators have traditionally
defended their explanations of veil-piercing law either in purely theo-
retical terms or, in a more traditional style of legal argumentation, by
citing a few supporting decisions as if the cited decisions were actually
representative of the pattern of reported decisions generally. Only recently
has anyone undertaken the monumental task of surveying the many
hundreds of veil-piercing decisions reported throughout the United States.
Robert Thompson last year presented his statistical findings from a
survey of all the American veil-piercing cases that he found in a Westlaw
43 U. Chi L. Rev. 527 (1976) (questioning whether bargaining postulated by Posner really
does occur, or can occur, as a practical matter).
6. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1036, 1036-
37 (1991).
7. The search for cases covered by this article was conducted on Westlaw, which
does not include in its database courts of appeal decisions reported before 1944. The
database covers supreme court decisions back to 1887, but the oldest supreme court case
recovered in this search was decided in 1936. One hundred seventeen veil-piercing decisions
were recovered in this search. Thirty-three other decisions were included in the data
considered for this article, as these cases considered the imposition of personal liability
on shareholders on some theory other than veil-piercing in situations in which veil-piercing
is often used. These cases are mentioned as appropriate in the text.
Veil-piercing cases antedating 1944 do exist in Louisiana, but the law they recite is not
materially different from that recited in modern cases. See, e.g., Lindstrom v. Sauer, 166
So. 636 (La. App. Orl. 1936); Lucey Mfg. Corp. v. Oil City Iron Works, 131 So. 57
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1930). That is not surprising, as veil-piercing doctrine is so flexible
that it is capable of accommodating a wide range of policy decisions without any apparent
disturbance to the black letter rules. It is possible that a survey of pre-1944 cases would
reflect some differences between older and newer cases in the results reached, but that
is actually a good reason to exclude those cases from this effort to describe the patterns
reached by modern courts. Ninety-six of the 117 veil-piercing cases covered by this article




search covering cases included in Westlaw through 1985-about 1600
cases-and concluded that several of the widely-accepted decisional pat-
terns identified by earlier writers appeared not to exist.8
This article tries to do on a much smaller scale (and without statistics)
what Professor Thompson's study did with cases nationally: to see what
patterns of results can be seen in veil-piercing cases when the cases are
not selected for the purpose of defending a postulated pattern, but when
an effort is made to gather all of the pertinent cases on the subject.
The smaller scale produces information with a narrower scope, but it
also allows a closer examination of the cases that are being reviewed. 9
In several respects, this examination has produced different conclusions
about Louisiana cases than those that Professor Thompson drew about
cases nationally. Whether this is due to real differences in the law as
applied in Louisiana'0 or merely to different interpretations-of similar
cases is difficult to say; it seems likely that both factors have played
some role.
FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY THEORY
The separate legal personality of a business corporation is clearly
fictional in nature; the law treats the corporation as a separate person
not because it really is a person, but because pretending that it is a
person achieves certain desired effects.
The most commonly-recited reason for the recognition of the separate
identity of the corporation is the policy of providing limited liability to
corporate shareholders, officers and agents." Yet there are many other,
8. Thompson, supra note 6.
9. All of the cases covered by this article could be, and were, read personally by
the author, and organized into categories that evolved as the cases were being read.
Understandably, Professor Thompson did not personally read all 1600 cases. He relied
on information gathered from the cases by seven research assistants. Id., supra note 6,
at 1044 n.48. Also, he organized his categories not to explain the cases anew, but to test
older explanations.
10. If any differences do exist, they are not attributable to Louisiana's status as a
"civil law" jurisidiction. Although the Louisiana Civil Code did traditionally contain a
few provisions on corporations, the Civil Code rules were so uniformly ignored by the
courts that their repeal in 1987 was viewed as nothing more than a technical matter.
Louisiana has not yet adopted the revised version of the Model Business Corporation
Act, but its corporate statute is in the mainstream of corporation statutes as they existed
at the time of its enactment in 1968.
II. Actually, it is only the shareholder who really needs corporation law to shield
him from liability. Without the corporate fiction, the shareholder would be treated as
the direct owner of the business involved, and therefore would be personally liable as a
proprietor or partner for the business debts and liabilities. Because nonshareholding
directors, officers, and agents serve in representative capacities only, normal principles of
agency law would shield them from personal liability, and impose it strictly on the owner/
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equally important objectives. In large organizations with many members,
for example, the corporate personality theory helps to simplify the
ownership, management, and transfer of property, the conduct of liti-
gation, and the making and'execution of collective, usually majoritarian,
decisions. Indeed in early law it was actually this simplifying function,
and not limited liability, that served as the principal impetus for cor-
porate forms of organization. Corporations were used for municipal,
ecclesiastical, and educational purposes long before they began to be
used in business,' 2 and even in business, the early corporations commonly
had limited liability denied to them. 3
The number and variety of functions served by the corporate entity
theory make it impossible to identify any one policy that ought to be
controlling in all veil-piercing cases. In practical terms, a court decision
about disregarding (or respecting) any given corporation's separate per-
sonality will operate not so much as a ruling on personality as such,
for divorced from its functional effects no one would care much whether
a corporation was a separate person, but rather as an indirect means
of stating a legal conclusion about the wisdom of imposing one or more
of the effects of the separate personality theory in that particular case.
Personality might well be rejected in one case in order to achieve a
certain legal objective, yet be respected in another, seemingly similar
case, in order to achieve some other objective. The balance of underlying
policies, not abstract separateness, tends to be the best predictor of
results. As the supreme court of the state has explained in Glazer v.
Commission on Ethics for Public Employees: 4
the problems involved [in veil-piercing cases] are to be solved
not by "disregarding" the corporate personality, but by a study
principals of the business. All that corporation law does for the officer or agent is to
make a fictional person the principal rather than the human beings that actually control
and obtain the benefits of the business as owners. However, it is so common in closely-
held businesses for the same person to be both a shareholder and agent of the corporation
that these fine distinctions are seldom drawn in the cases; upon mention of the imposition
of personal liability in a corporate setting, the first thing that comes to the mind of most
'lawyers is veil-piercing.
12. See R. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation, 1784-1855,
at 9-32 (1982); L. Friedman, A History of American Law 188-91 (2d ed. 1973); H. Henn
& J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations 14-19 (3d ed. 1983); Williston, History of the
Law of Business'Corporations Before 1800, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 105 (1888); Raymond, The
Genesis of the Corporation, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 350 (1906).
13. L. Friedman, A History of American Law 191 (2d ed. 1973); Blumberg, Limited
Liability and Corporate Groups, 1i J. Corp. Law 573, 577-603 (1986). Modern Louisiana
law continues a similar practice with respect to partnerships: it declares them to be separate
legal entities, but nevertheless imposes personal liability on partners for partnership debts.
La. Civ. Code arts. 2801, 2817.
14. 431 So. 2d 752 (La. 1983).
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of the just and reasonable limitations upon the exercise of the
privilege of separate capacity under particular circumstances in
view of its proper use and functions. The policies behind rec-
ognition of a separate corporate existence must be balanced
against the policies justifying piercing .... Depending upon the
various competing policies and interests involved, the same fac-
tual scenario may result in recognition of a separate corporate
identity for some purposes . . . and a disallowance of the sep-
arate corporate entity privilege for others.' 5
THE FALSE AsSUMPTIONS OF THE BLACK LETTER LAW
Unfortunately, Glazer's functional style of analysis is a rare find in
the Louisiana law of veil-piercing. Most decisions are written as if the
courts were being asked to engage in some kind of metaphysical inquiry
into the true nature of corporate separateness. Judges explain their veil-
piercing decisions on the basis of rules and "factors" tending "under
the totality of circumstances" either to support or to undermine a finding
that this particular corporation really is the type of separate business
organization contemplated by the business corporation statute. 6 If ad-
equately separate, the corporation's distinct personality will be respected,
while if not, depending on the equities of the case, it may be disregarded.
The common metaphors are "alter ego" and "instrumentality"-if a
corporation is one of these, the normal effects of the corporate entity
theory, such as limited liability, may be lost.
This approach, of resolving all veil-piercing questions by juxtaposing
idealized corporations that "truly" have a separate personality against
real world "alter egos" that do not, is fundamentally misguided. First
of all, it treats many different issues as if they were the same., Com-
mercial debts are not distinguished from personal injury claims, and
questions of civil procedure, statutory interpretation, and property own-
15. Id. at 757-58 (citations and explanatory examples omitted).
16. See, e.g., Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (1991
WL 255914, 1991 LEXIS 3373); Withers v. Timber Products, Inc., 574 So. 2d 1291 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 378 (1991); Sea Tang Fisheries, Inc. v. You'll
See Sea Foods, Inc., 569 So. 2d 992 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So. 2d
89 (1991).
17. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 979, 981 (1971); Latty, The
Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 597, 621-22 (1936)
("Entity-disregard rules are applied to the solution of various problems which have little
in common except that they involve corporations and lend themselves to a common entity
terminology.").
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ership are all resolved with a single set of rules." Second, many of the
rules and factors used to resolve these myriad issues have little or nothing
to do with any of the functional questions actually being posed. 9 A
lack of board meetings may thus be used to impose personal liability
on a shareholder for a corporate debt,20 when it is plain that hundreds
of board meetings would have made no difference in the corporation's
ability to pay. Finally, and most importantly, veil-piercing doctrine im-
plicitly assumes two things to be true that really are not: that most
corporations do have some genuine separate existence, and that it is
this genuinely separate existence that justifies the law's separate per-
sonality rule. Veil-piercing doctrine forgets that corporate personalities
are always fictional. It falsely assumes that when corporations are used
for legitimate, lawful purposes, their personalities will somehow be real,
and that corporation law simply recognizes legally what is already true
in fact.
This assumption does not create any veil-piercing problems for the
shareholders of major, publicly-traded corporations.' Public corpora-
18. Compare, Henry J. Mills Co. v. Crawfish Capitol Seafood, Inc., 569 So. 2d
1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (commercial debt); Giuffria v. Red River Barge Lines, Inc.,
452 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 118 (1984) (personal injury);
Coury v. Coury Moss, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (civil procedure-
shareholder derivative action); Robertson Tank Lines. Inc. v. La. Public Serv. Comm.,
349 So. 2d 1262 (La. 1977) (statutory interpretation-prohibition of one person's holding
both common carrier and contract carrier certificates); and Keller v. Haas, 12 So. 2d 238
(La. 1943) (property ownership, interpretation of recordation requirements, public records
doctrine).
19. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 979, 981 (1971); Latty, The
Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 597, 634-35 (1936)
(in answering questions posed in veil-piercing cases "interests have to be balanced and
issues determined; but the regard or disregard of the corporate entity is not one of those
issues").
20. E.g., Giuffria v. Red River Barge Lines, Inc., 452 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 118 (1984); Smith-Hearron v. Frazier, Inc., 352 So. 2d
263 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 353 So. 2d 1337 (1978); Dillman v. Nobles,
351 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977). In all of these cases, the defendant engaged
in financial misdealings that justified the veil-piercing, but exactly the same transactions
could have occurred with or without board meetings.
21. It can create problems for subsidiaries, especially wholly-owned subsidiaries, of
public corporations. See Abraham v. Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1979), writ denied, 380 So. 2d 99, 100 (1980). But wholly-owned subsidiaries, like
one-owner small business corporations, are rarely anything other than instrumentalities
through which the controlling shareholder conducts some part of its overall business;
many of the factors that would support veil-piercing in a one-owner small business
corporation will also be present in a wholly-owned subsidiary of a public corporation.
Indeed, some commentators have suggested that courts ought to be more willing to pierce
within an affiliated group of corporations than they are in piercing to noncontrolling
shareholders in the ultimate parent corporation. See supra note 5. Moreover, apart from
1991]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
tions do seem to fit - indeed to be the model for - the idealized "separate
entity" that the veil-piercing doctrine assumes to be the norm. But this
kind of corporation is virtually irrelevant to veil-piercing law, except as
a false model of what a "true" corporation looks like. Publicly-traded
corporations comprise a tiny percentage of all business corporations
chartered in the United States," and judging from the cases reported
in Westlaw's database, no American court, in Louisiana or elsewhere,
has ever pierced the veil of a publicly-traded corporation."3
It is only the closely-held corporation 4 that has a realistic chance
of having its separate corporate personality disregarded, and even among
closely-held corporations, the danger is limited almost entirely to cor-
porations that have just one shareholder or, if more than one share-
holder, a single shareholder that clearly predominates in control and
profit participation.' For those kinds of companies, more numerous by
veil-piercing, the separate personality theory can be used in connection with public cor-
porations to gloss over the very real internal conflicts that can arise among different parts
of the theoretically unified, single personality of the corporation.
22. Precise data on this point is difficult to find, but one survey published in 1976
provided these estimates:
Over 90% of corporations have 10 or fewer shareholders;
Less than 107o have more than 100; and
Less than 0.5% have more than 1,000;
A. Conard, Corporations in Perspective 118 (1976).
23. Thompson, supra note 6, at 1047.
24. Included among closely held corporations would be subsidiaries of other cor-
porations.
25. Although the Thompson study, supra note 6, at 1054-55, suggests that veil-piercing
is nearly as common in corporations with two or three shareholders as it is in one-owner
companies (piercing occurred 46% of the time in the two- or three-owner corporations,
as compared to 50% in one-owner corporations), the Thompson data does not disclose
the roles played by the "extra" shareholders in the multiple-owner companies. It seems
likely that many of the extra shareholders played passive, even nominee, roles (nominee
owners were often used in early practice to circumvent the "three-shareholder" requirements
common in early corporation statutes), and Professor Thompson does observe that courts
almost never pierce to shareholders whom they have described as passive investors. Thomp-
son, supra note 6, at 1056-57. In any case, except where married couples have been
involved, no case reported in Louisiana since 1944 (see supra note 7) has ever used veil-
piercing doctrine to impose personal liability on anyone other than a sole or dominant
shareholder. Even where other shareholders have held significant interests in the "pierced"
corporations, the courts have limited their veil-piercing judgments to the dominant share-
holder. Compare George A. Hormel & Co. v. Ford, 486 So. 2d 927 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1986) (veil pierced to husband and wife who owned all stock) with Sea Tang Fisheries,
Inc. v. You'll See Sea Foods, Inc., 569 So. 2d 992 (La. App. tst Cir. 1990), writ denied,
572 So. 2d 89 (1991) (trial court pierced to 75% shareholder, refused to pierce to three
other shareholders owning 15%, 5%, and 5% of stock, respectively; all veil-piercing
reversed on appeal); Giuffria v. Red River Barge Lines, Inc.. 452 So. 2d 793 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 118 (1984) (veil pierced to 7207o parent corporation);
LeBlanc v. Opt, Inc., 421 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d
[Vol. 52
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far than publicly-traded corporations, veil-piercing doctrine makes it
appear that the courts are deciding many different and important issues
by engaging in beyond-the-looking-glass debates about whether a solely-
owned (or solely-dominated) small business corporation really has a
separate existence or is instead just an "instrumentality" or "alter ego"
of its principal owner. This in turn forces the principal owner of the
corporation into defending some effect of the separate entity fiction by
trying to prove to the court that the fiction is really true, that contrary
to all common sense, his corporation really is something more than an
instrumentality through which he conducts his business.
Of course it's an instrumentality. What else would it be?
One-owner business corporations are going to do precisely what their
owners want them to do, when they want them to do it, and for
whatever reasons the owners consider to be sufficient. Incorporated one-
owner businesses will differ from unincorporated sole proprietorships in
strictly formal ways that have little to do with the nature of the issues
posed in the typical veil-piercing case. 6 Even if all the "corporate"
formalities" are followed, these formalities will function mainly as im-
pediments to more direct, sensible methods of management.2 They will
not separate the "personality" of the corporation-its policies and prac-
438 and 429 So. 2d 132 (1983) (veil pierced to individual who was 80% shareholder of
parent corporation of fifteen subsidiary corporations).
26. The degree to which business and personal assets are segregated from one another
will usually be important in deciding whether to respect the limited liability of a shareholder,
and the commingling of "corporate" and personal assets is frequently recited as a factor
supporting veil-piercing. However, both asset segregation and some forms of limited liability
(i.e., nonrecourse credit) can occur with or without incorporation.
27. It is something of a misnomer to call these formalities "corporate" formalities.
The chief characteristic of "corporate" management, and the foundation of "corporate"
formalities, is the board of directors. The board functions, in theory, as a group of
business supervisors who engage in or monitor management on behalf of shareholders.
This type of centralized, representative management is more a function of the size of a
business, and the number of owners, than it is a characteristic of any particular type of
organization from a legal standpoint. Small corporations and partnerships tend in practice
to be operated informally and directly by their owners, while large, publicly-traded or-
ganizations tend to have indirect, representative management regardless of whether they
are corporations or partnerships.
28. The very requirement of management formalities in a small, closely-held cor-
poration is open to considerable criticism. Most reported veil-piercing decisions deal with
corporations owned or controlled entirely by one person. Yet under existing rules this
one person is supposed to hold a shareholder's meeting with himself at least once a year
or, in lieu of the meeting, to sign a "unanimous written consent." La. R.S. 12:73 A,
76 (1969). He is supposed to use this meeting to elect at least one director, which will
almost always be himself. La. R.S. 12:81 A (1969). Then, as the company's sole director,
the shareholder is supposed to hold meetings with himself (or sign written consents),
through which he adopts resolutions authorizing someone, almost always himself, to take
certain actions in the name and on behalf of the corporation. La. R.S. 12:81 A, C (9),
1991]
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tices-from complete dominance by the principal shareholder. 19 With or
without the formalities, the sole shareholder is still going to use the
corporation as an instrument or alter ego to carry out precisely the
same transactions, creating the same benefits and subject to the same
control, as he would be carrying out personally if he owned the business
directly and could limit his liability in some other way.
ACCOMMODATING REAUTY-VEL-PIERCINO "TESTS"
Judging from actual results in the reported cases, there seems little
doubt that Louisiana courts do realize that one-owner corporations are
almost always operated as instrumentalities or alter egos of their owners;
not a single case covered by this article'0 has imposed personal liability
on a corporate shareholder strictly on "alter ego or instrumentality"
grounds, where some form of misrepresentation, financial impropriety
82 D (1969 and Supp. 1991).
What actually happens in many, if not most, one-person corporations is much more
sensible: the sole shareholder will keep separate financial and tax-reporting records for
the incorporated business, but will end up managing the company informally, as if it he
owned the business directly. Accord, Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., No. 91-C-0963 (La.
Dec. 2, 1991) (1991 WL 255914, 1991 LEXIS 3373) (noting the filing of tax returns, but
observing that close corporations are often managed by majority or sole shareholder,
without many formal board meetings). The only resolutions that will appear in the corporate
minute books are those required to formalize transactions involving financial institutions
and/or immovable property. Cf., Tedesco v. Gentry Development, Inc., 540 So. 2d 960
(La. 1989) (written authorization required to empower agent to bind principal to a contract
to sell immovable property; "written resolution" apparently contemplated).
The latest model act for close corporations pays little attention to corporate formalities.
It explicitly authorizes the abolition of the board of directors, and the direct management
of a closely held corporation by its shareholders. It also provides that the failure of a
statutory close corporation to observe the usual corporate formalities is not to be treated
as a ground for the imposition of personal liability on shareholders for the debts of the
corporation. Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement §§ 21, 25.
29. Just as it is difficult to see why a mere failure to observe corporate formalities
ought to lead to a piercing of the corporate veil, so is it difficult to see why the mere
observance of corporate formalities, no matter how scrupulous, ought to immunize a
shareholder from personal liability to creditors where he has used his control power over
the corporation to cause it-with all kinds of meetings, minutes, seals, and ribbons-to
transfer assets to him or his relatives or affiliates in a way that does cause harm the
legally-protected interests of those creditors. See LeBlanc v. Opt, Inc., 421 So. 2d 984
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 438 and 429 So. 2d 132 (1983) (despite
formal-though general-corporate authorizations, frequent inter-company transactions
among fifteen affiliated corporations considered to be a factor justifying veil-piercing to
the controlling shareholder); cf., Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App.
Ist Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 668 (1991) (complicated structure of affiliated corporate
dealings disregarded, affiliates treated as "single business enterprise").
30. See supra note 7.
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or inequity was not also present."' Indeed, what shapes much of the
black letter law of veil-piercing in Louisiana is the effort by the courts
to reconcile the alter ego theory they say they are following with their
apparent conclusion that most one-owner corporations are, in any re-
alistic sense, alter egos whose separate identities nevertheless ought to
be respected for most purposes.
To avoid piercing the veil of most small business corporations, the
jurisprudence has developed several defense-favoring rules that tend to
suggest that many of the characteristics of alter-ego corporations are
really not so bad. Thus, it is well-established that the veil may not be
pierced due solely to the following facts:
1. that the shareholder owns a majority 2 of the stock, most
of the stock,3  or even all of the stock of the corporation;
34
2. that the corporation was minimally capitalized;"s or
31. There is one category of case in which instrumentality status will, by itself, result
in veil-piercing: where the shareholder is using the corporation to circumvent some legal
restriction on his own, personal behavior. See infra text accompanying notes 109-21,
32. Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (1991 WL 255914,
1991 LEXIS 3373); Landry v. St. Charles Inn, Inc., 446 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1984); Peters v. Crochet Homes, Inc., 370 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Matassa
v. Temple, 346 So. 2d 803 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 349 So. 2d 332 (1977);
Kingsman Enterprises, Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d 1280 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1976); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Dupuy & Dupuy Developers, Inc., 227 So. 2d 265 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1969).
33. Riggins, No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991); Sea Tang Fisheries, Inc. v. You'll
See Sea Foods, Inc., 569 So. 2d 992 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So. 2d
89 (1991); Kingsman Enterprises, Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d 1280 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1976); Johnson v. H. W. Parson Motors, Inc., 231 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1970); National Surety Corp. v. Pope, 147 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
34. Central Business Forms, Inc. v. N-Sure Systems, Inc., 540 So. 2d 1029 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1989); Chin v. Roussel, 456 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 459
So. 2d 540 (1984); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper, 430 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1983); Hock v. Sea Camper of New Orleans, Inc., 419 So. 2d 1315 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1182 (1982); Peters v. Crochet Homes, Inc., 370 So. 2d
651 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Johansen v. Port Jewell, Inc., 351 So. 2d 184 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 352 So. 2d 705 (1977); Sampay v. Davis, 342 So. 2d 1186 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1977); Kingsman Enterprises, Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d 1280
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Camp v. Gibbs, 331 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Cole
v. Golemi, 271 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Hughes Realty Co. v. Pfister, 245
So. 2d 757 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971). Cf. Riggins, No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991)
(citing statutory authorization of one shareholder corporations, and characterizing corporate
management by majority or sole stockholder as common among closely held corporations).
35. Sea Tang Fisheries, Inc. v. You'll See Sea Foods, Inc., 569 So. 2d 992 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 89 (1991); Harris v. Best of Am., Inc., 466
So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 470 So. 2d 121 (1985); McGregor v. United
Film Corp., 351 So. 2d 1224 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), writ denied, 353 So. 2d 1335,
1341 (1978); Johansen v. Port Jewell, Inc., 351 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
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3. that the corporation was incorporated by the shareholder
for the very purpose of avoiding personal liability. 6
Moreover, it is declared to be the strong policy of Louisiana to
favor the recognition of the corporation's separate existence, so that
veil-piercing is an extraordinary remedy, to be granted only rarely.3 7
In effect, therefore, Louisiana courts have endorsed some seemingly
inconsistent propositions: that while it is wrong to use a corporation as
an "alter ego" or "instrumentality" in some unexplained improper sense
of the word, it is nevertheless all right for a person to engage in business
through a one-owner, minimally-capitalized corporation that was set up
by the shareholder for the very purpose of avoiding legal responsibility
for the obligations incurred by that business. The difficult question left
denied, 352 So. 2d 705 (1977); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Dupuy & Dupuy Developers, Inc.,
227 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969). Cf., Henry J. Mills Co. v. Crawfish Capitol
Seafood, Inc., 569 So. 2d 1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (capital structure consisting
entirely of $160,000 in debt and some undocumented contributions of labor by the three
shareholders, who contributed no money or property, considered not to be inadequate
capitalization).
36. Sea Tang Fisheries, Inc. v. You'll See Sea Foods, Inc., 569 So. 2d 992 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 89 (1991). Central Business Forms, Inc. v.
N-Sure Systems, Inc., 540 So. 2d 1029 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989); Chaney v. Godfrey, 535
So. 2d 918 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Harris v. Best of Am., Inc., 466 So. 2d 1309 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 470 So. 2d 121 (1985); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper,
430 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Peters v. Crochet Homes, Inc., 370 So. 2d 651
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Johansen v. Port Jewell, Inc., 351 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 352 So. 2d 705 (1977); Matassa v. Temple, 346 So. 2d 803 (La. App.
ist Cir.), writ denied, 349 So. 2d 332 (1977); Sampay v. Davis, 342 So. 2d 1186 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1977); Hughes Realty Co. v. Pfister, 245 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1971); L. L. Ridgway Co. v. Marks, 146 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). See Riggins,
No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (noting with approval the law's provision of limited
liability as a means of encouraging investment).
37. Riggins, No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991). E.g., Deroche v. P & L Constr.
Materials, Inc., 554 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 1359
(1990); Byles Welding & Tractor Co. v. Butts Sales & Serv., Inc., 541 So. 2d 992 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 1224 (1989), later appeal, 578 So. 2d 106 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1991); Chaney v. Godfrey, 535 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Sparks
v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 517 So. 2d 1036 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 519 So.
2d 106 (1987); Hemphill-Kunstler-Buhler, Auctioneers & Appraisers v. Davis Wholesale
Elec. Supply Co., 516 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 751
(1988), later appeal, 555 So. 2d 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 571
(1990); GRW Engineers, Inc. v. Elam, 504 So. 2d 117 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
506 So. 2d 1230 (1987); Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Van Stavern, 496 So. 2d 1360
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 757 (1986); Harris v. Best of Am., Inc.,
466 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 470 So. 2d 121 (1985); Chin v. Roussel,
456 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 459 So. 2d 540 (1984); American Bank
of Welch v. Smith Aviation, Inc., 433 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Abraham v.
Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 380 So. 2d 99,
100 (1980).
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unanswered is which one of these two propositions a given court is
likely to emphasize in a particular case-the one prohibiting an alter
ego in some bad sense of the term or the one that allows such an
arrangement in the ordinary sense that the incorporated business is, not
surprisingly, operated pretty much as if the shareholders owned it.
According to black letter doctrine, this difficult choice between
acceptable and bad alter egos is made on the basis of a flexible test in
which the corporate existence can be respected or disregarded depending
on the court's evaluation of a list of unweighted "factors," almost
always said to include, but not limited to:
1. commingling of personal and corporate funds;
2. the observance of statutory formalities in the incorporation
and operation of the company;"
38. It is impossible in most veil-piercing decisions to find any causal relationship
between a failure to observe corporate formalities and the plaintiff's loss; companies rarely
fail from an insufficiency of board meetings. It is odd, therefore, that courts put this
kind of emphasis on formalities. It is as if courts in automobile accident cases were giving
judgments to plaintiffs based on the defendants' failure to pay their parking tickets. (The
result in the automobile case only seems more absurd than the in the veil-piercing decision
because the reasoning in the automobile case is more straightforward and less clouded in
metaphors about alter egos and instrumentalities. Without these metaphors, the absurdity
is obvious in both cases: a plaintiff is being given a windfall recovery based on conduct
by the defendant that, while unlawful, had absolutely nothing to do with plaintiff's loss.).
Indeed, wholly apart from considerations of policy, it seems wrong for courts to act
as if they are enforcing the positive requirements of corporation law when they choose
to pierce the veil based on the shareholders' failure to hold shareholder and director
meetings as contemplated by the corporate statute. Yes, the corporation statute does
require these meetings to be held, but it most certainly does not condition the recognition
of the corporation's separate existence on shareholder compliance with these various
procedural requirements. As far as the corporation statute itself is concerned, only one
thing is necessary to the creation and existence of the corporation as a separate legal
person: the issuance of a certificate of incorporation by the secretary of state. As long
as that certificate remains unrevoked, and the state itself brings no action to annul the
corporate charter, the statute considers the corporation to exist for all purposes. La. R.S.
12:25 B. Thus, a decision to pierce the veil of a corporation for which a certificate of
incorporation has been issued, and remains unrevoked, is not a decision that enforces
the positive rule of the corporation statute, but one that overrides it. An override of that
kind might well be justified on policy grounds other than the enforcement of the statute
itself, but it is quite wrong to construe the statute to require what it plainly rejects: veil-
piercing on grounds of post-incorporation informalities.
As a practical matter, despite the black letter theory, it seems likely that the courts'
use of informality as a veil-piercing factor is due more to its usefulness as makeweight
than to the courts' genuine belief that such a factor really is important in reaching a
fair result in the cases they must decide. Ironically, it is the very commonness of informality
that makes it so tempting to cite it in support of the "exceptional" remedy of veil-
piercing, for when a court does wish to pierce the veil, it can easily find these sorts of
factors to justify its decision. They will exist in most small corporations. Still, the actual
pattern of results in veil-piercing cases does not bear out the black letter suggestion that
corporate formalities really are important in a court's veil-piercing decisions.
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3. undercapitalization;
4. whether a separate bank account has been established for the
corporation, and whether its financial records are separately
maintained; and
5. whether regular meetings of shareholders and directors have
been held.
39
Yet the "five factors" test is not limited to these points alone. Not
only is the list of five factors said to be nonexclusive, but another rule
requires that they be considered in light of "the totality of circum-
stances" presented in the case, thus opening up the inquiry into anything
the court chooses to consider. 40 Moreover, the court's decision about
how these various factors'are to be weighted, and about the other
factors that the court cares to consider (whether or not those factors
are actually mentioned) is subject to the further protection of a rule
that declares that such decisions are "primarily questions of fact, best
decided by the trial court, ' 4' and sometimes, that such questions of
fact are subject to reversal only in the case of manifest error. 42
39. Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (1991 WL 255914,
1991 LEXIS 3373). E.g., Henry J. Mills Co. v. Crawfish Capitol Seafood, Inc., 569 So.
2d 1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990); Sea Tang Fisheries, Inc. v. You'll See Sea Foods, Inc.,
569 So. 2d 992 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 89 (1991); T. L. James
& Co. v. Kenner Landing, Inc., 550 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 562
So. 2d 914 (1990); Cohn v. Heymann, 544 So. 2d 1242 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
548 So. 2d 1233 (1989); Central Business Forms, Inc. v. N-Sure Systems, Inc., 540 So.
2d 1029 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989); Chancy v. Godfrey, 535 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1988); Cardinale v. Lindheim, 512 So. 2d 1232 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987); Coury v. Coury
Moss, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); G.1.'s Club of Slidell, Inc. v.
American Legion Post No. 374, 504 So. 2d 967 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); GRW Engineers,
Inc. v. Elam, 504 So. 2d 117 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 506 So. 2d 1230 (1987);
Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Van Stavern, 496 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 498 So. 2d 757 (1986); George A. Hormel & Co. v. Ford, 486 So. 2d 927 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1986); West Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Daley, 476 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1985); Harris v. Best of Am., Inc., 466 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
470 So. 2d 121 (1985); Entech Systems Corp. v. Gaffney, 466 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1985); Holley v. Palermo, 461 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); Giuffria v. Red
River Barge Lines, Inc., 452 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d
118 (1984); Landry v. St Charles Inn, Inc., 446 So. 2d 1247 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984);
American Bank of Welch v. Smith Aviation, Inc., 433 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1983); Kingsman Enterprises, Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d 1280 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1976).
40. Riggins, No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991). In one case, the court considered
eighteen factors, yet still emphasized that the list was illustrative only, and did not exhaust
all the factors that might be considered. Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249,
257.58 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 668 (1991).
41. E.g., Byles Welding & Tractor Co. v. Butts Sales & Service, Inc., 541 So. 2d
992 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 1224 (1989), latter app., 578 So. 2d 246
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Terry v. Guillory, 538 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989);
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Besides the five factors approach, Louisiana courts have also de-
veloped a parallel "two-part" test based on Kingsman Enterprises, Inc.
v. Bakerfield Electric Co.,4 1 a test that is sometimes used by itself, and
sometimes used in conjunction with some or all of the "five factors/
totality of circumstances/exceptional remedy" rules. Under the Kingsman
test the veil may be pierced if:
the corporation is an alter ego and has been used by the share-
holder to carry out some sort of fraud or
even in the absence of fraud, the shareholder has failed to
Chancy v. Godfrey, 535 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Coury v. Coury Moss,
Inc., 510 So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); George A. Hormel & Co. v. Ford, 486
So. 2d 927 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); Elnaggar v. Fred Moran Constr. Corp., 468 So.
2d 803 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Entech Systems Corp. v. Gaffney, 466 So. 2d 788 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1985); Holley v. Palermo, 461 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); Chin
v. Roussel, 456 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 459 So. 2d 540 (1984). But
cf. Riggins, No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (standard of review unclear; no apparent
deference to trial court's veil piercing decisions, but reversal based in part on conclusion
that key factual findings not supported by the record).
42. E.g., Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 580 So. 2d 668 (1991); Laporte, Sehrt, Romig & Hand, CPA's v. Gulf Island
Operations, Inc., 557 So. 2d 359 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 561 So. 2d 120 (1990);
Terry v. Guillory, 538 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Quaglino Tobacco & Candy
Co. v. Barr, 519 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); Coury v. Coury Moss, Inc., 510
So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); George A. Hormel & Co. v. Ford, 486 So. 2d
927 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper, 430 So. 2d 143 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1983); Majestic Floor Coverings, Inc. v. Lawson, 424 So. 2d 504 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1982); First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Davis, 365 So. 2d 8 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978). Although there are exceptions, the manifest error rule tends to be cited in those
cases in Which the trial court is affirmed. Where the decision is to be reversed, the court
usually ignores the manifest error rule, and instead recites the rule that limited liability
for shareholders is the firmly-established rule in Louisiana, and that veil-piercing is an
exceptional remedy, to be granted only rarely. See, e.g., Riggins, No. 91-C-0963 (La.
Dec. 2, 1991); Deroche v. P & L Constr. Materials, Inc., 554 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 1359 (1990); Byles Welding & Tractor Co. v. Butts
Sales & Service, Inc., 541 So. 2d 992 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 1224
(1989), later app., 528 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Harris v. Best of Am., Inc.,
466 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 470 So. 2d 121 (1985) (trial court
reversed, without mentioning of manifest error rule, on grounds that plaintiff had not
satisfied his "heavy burden of producing clear and convincing evidence" that corporation
was shareholder's alter ego); Chin v. Roussel, 456 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 459 So. 2d 540 (1984).
43. 339 So. 2d 1280 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976). For cases applying the Kingsman test,
see, e.g., Riggins, No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991); Henry J. Mills Co. v. Crawfish
Capitol Seafood, Inc., 569 So. 2d 1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990); T.L. James & Co. v.
Kenner Landing, Inc., 550 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), aff., 562 So. 2d 914
(1990); Chaney v. Godfrey, 535 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Harris v. Best of
Am., Inc., 466 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 470 So. 2d 121 (1985);
Abraham v. Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied,
380 So. 2d 99 (1980).
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conduct business on a "corporate footing" to such an extent
that the corporation has become indistinguishable from the share-
holder. 4
In effect, the Kingsman test (if it is applied by itself) lets a court
tolerate a great deal of informality on the part of a shareholder, as
long as "fraud" is not present, but threatens the shareholder with liability
at some point-seemingly based purely on the lack of corporate for-
malities-even if no fraudulent behavior occurred.45
FLEXIBILITY AND UNCERTAINTY
The bottom line on the black letter law is that the courts have not
identified any one factor, by itself, that would result in veil-piercing,
and indeed have said explicitly that a number of common practices, for
example, sole shareholding and low capitalization, will not in and of
themselves justify veil-piercing. However, it remains true that most of
the factors that a court will consider "under the totality of circum-
stances" in a veil-piercing case are things that are common in most
small business corporations: low capitalization and informality in man-
agement. Thus, depending on whether a court wishes to pierce the veil,
it can emphasize either the claimant-oriented side of the rules (for
example, that undercapitalization is a factor that supports veil-piercing)
or the defense-oriented side (that minimal capitalization is acceptable,
and that shareholders are entitled to form a corporation for the very
purpose of avoiding personal liability). Using this technique throughout
their decisions, courts are able to make whatever decision they consider
to be fair, without explaining what they are doing and why. The only
thing they must show is that they have considered an unweighted list
of "factors" under the "totality of circumstances" in what is "pri-
44. 339 So. 2d at 1282.
45. The second half of the Kingsman test is strange indeed; it seems to call for the
loss of limited liability based solely on technical transgressions without regard to any
causal connection between the lack of formalities and any losses suffered by the parties
in the case. Although most courts recite Kingsman without paying much attention to the
extraordinary implications of the second part of the test, at least one court has openly
expressed doubt about it, and no reported decision has actually used it as a means of
imposing liability in the absence of fraud or inequity of some kind. See, Abraham v.
Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d 465, 469 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 380 So.
2d 99, 100 (1980) ("While we understand from the jurisprudence that it is not necessary
to establish fraud in order to support the alter ego theory we are satisfied that the
doctrine contains equitable features which require that the type of claim and the relative
positions of the parties be considered before applying the doctrine."); Comment, Piercing
the Corporate Veil in Louisiana Absent Fraud or Deceit, 48 La. L. Rev. 1229, 1234-36
(1988) (finding a few cases in which actual fraud or deceit did not occur, but still finding
reasons for piercing other than mere lack of corporate formalities).
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marily" a factual inquiry. Practically any result can be reconciled with
that sort of law.41
Flexibility has its advantages, of course, but it has costs as well.
Limited liability is supposed to be dependable, as veil-piercing is supposed
to be an exceptional remedy only rarely granted. However, the law is
so vague and so disconnected from any nonmetaphorical explanation of
policy that substantial settlements based on the risk of veil-piercing must
be fairly common. Summary judgments on this issue are difficult to
sustain because it is rare for a closely-held small business corporation
not to display at least some of the factors that might be used to support
veil-piercing.47 Thus, despite the nominal rarity of veil-piercing, the
vagueness of the law makes shareholder liability a serious consideration
in many, if not most, lawsuits in which the plaintiff is seeking to collect
on the debt of a small, closely held business corporation.
ACTUAL RESULTS-INTRODUCTION
The actual results in veil-piercing cases are not nearly so difficult
to predict, understand and explain as the black letter doctrine might
lead one to think. It is possible to see a pattern of decisions that explains
quite well the types of factors that truly are important in these veil-
46. This does not necessarily mean that a trial court decision on veil-piercing is
difficult to reverse; judging from reported cases, trial courts are considerably more likely
to pierce than are the appellate courts. The point here is that the "law" that is applied
at both the trial and appellate levels is so vague that it is difficult to point to any
particular feature in the law that dictates one result rather than another. This is as true
concerning the standard of review as it is for the substantive question itself. When appellate
courts wish to uphold a trial court decision, they may simply defer to the "primarily"
factual finding of the trial court, and when they wish to reverse, they may emphasize
the legal policy that veil-piercing be treated as an extraordinary remedy, only rarely
granted. Compare Henry J. Mills Co. v. Crawfish Capitol Seafood, Inc., 569 So. 2d
1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990); Quaglino Tobacco & Candy Co. v. Barr, 519 So. 2d 200
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); George A. Hormel & Co. v. Ford, 486 So. 2d 927 (La. App.
ist Cir. 1986); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper, 430 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1983) (affirming, deferring to trial court "factual" finding) with Riggins v. Dixie Shoring
Co., No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (1991 WL 255914, 1991 LEXIS 3373); Sea Tang
Fisheries, Inc. v. You'll See Sea Foods, Inc. 569 So. 2d 992 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990),
writ denied, 572 So. 2d 89 (1991); Deroche v. P & L Constr. Materials, Inc., 554 So.
2d 717 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), writ denied,.559 So. 2d 1359 (1990); Byles Welding &
Tractor Co. v. Butts Sales & Serv., Inc., 541 So. 2d 992 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
546 So. 2d 1224 (1989), later app., 578 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Harris v.
Best of Am., Inc., 466 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 470 So. 2d 121
(1985); Chin v. Roussel, 456 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 459 So. 2d
540 (1984) (reversing, citing legal policy that veil-piercing an exceptional remedy).
47. See Entech Systems Corp. v. Gaffney, 466 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985)
(reversing summary judgment for the defendant based solely on a C.P.A.'s affidavit to
the effect that some affiliated, closely-held corporations had not kept adequate separate
accounts and had not observed certain corporate formalities).
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piercing cases, and those that are not. But to see this pattern, it is first
necessary to see the point made at the outset of this discussion: that
the separate personality of a corporation is not a reason for reaching
any particular result, but simply a metaphorical means of stating the
result itself. Shareholders do not have limited liability because a cor-
poration is really a separate entity. Rather, the law pretends that a
corporation is a separate entity as a means of conferring this limited
liability on shareholders.
Despite the black letter doctrine, the single most important question
to ask in a veil-piercing case is really not whether the corporation has
in some sense maintained some genuine separateness, but instead why
its purely fictional separateness is being attacked in that particular case.
It seems rather obvious, for example, that an attempt to pierce a
corporate veil to allow a bank to collect from shareholders on a corporate
loan not guaranteed by those shareholders is something quite different
from a veil-piercing effort by a personal injury victim against the share-
holders of an uninsured, thinly capitalized corporation. By asking "why"
a veil is to be pierced, rather than "whether," a practitioner is much
closer to predicting actual results: he will be much more likely to see
that the claim of the tort victim is stronger than that of the bank, even
if the purported veil-piercing "factors" in the two cases are in all other
respects exactly the same. The remainder of this article, therefore, is
organized along those lines. Veil-piercing cases are organized by func-
tional type-depending on the nature of the issue involved-and are
discussed from different policy perspectives depending upon the types
of cases involved.
THE ENTITY AND LIMITED LIABILITY
The connection in corporation law' between limited liability and the
separate entity theory is as much an accident of history as anything
else. Certainly, there is nothing logically unavoidable about the current
relationship of the two concepts. As indicated in Louisiana's corporate
statute itself, it is quite possible simply to declare as a matter of positive
law that shareholders are not to be considered personally liable for the
debts of their incorporated businesses," and as indicated in Louisiana's
partnership law, it is equally possible to treat a business organization
as an entity for many purposes 4 9 yet continue to insist that its owners
remain personally liable for its debts.'0 Corporations were treated as
entities for durational and ownership transfer purposes long before their
48. La. R.S. 12:93 B (1969).
49. La. Civ. Code art. 2801.
50. -La. Civ. Code art. 2817.
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entity status was thought to have anything to do with limited liability,'1
and early forms of "limited" liability still required shareholders to be
responsible for double or triple the amount of their shares' purchase
prices, or even for their pro rata share of corporate obligations." For
banks, double liability provisions continued until they were proven in-
effective in the Great Depression."
It really is unfortunate that corporation law, despite its early history,
has chosen to rationalize limited liability as it has, not as a means of
implementing a policy decision about the allocation of business risks,
but as a logical corollary of separateness." This has done nothing but
confuse things, for it has led lawyers and judges to think that the key
question in a limited liability case is not about limited liability, as such,
but about the purely fictional and formal separation of a corporation
from its owners. Despite the weaknesses in the black letter theory,
however, the results in the reported cases suggest that Louisiana courts
exercise sound judgment in deciding these types of disputes. Although
little is said explicitly about distinctions among various kinds of limited
liability problems, the courts seem intuitively capable of giving them
effect.
51. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. Corp. L. 573, 588
(1986).
52. Id. at 597-601.
53. Id. at 601.
54. Although the corporation statute declares explicitly that shareholders are not to
be held personally liable for the debts of the corporation, La. R.S. 12:93 B (1969), there
is no doubt that this declaration of limited liability is thought by the courts to be based
on the corporation having a legal personality separate and distinct from that of its
shareholders. E.g., Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (1991
WL 255914, 1991 LEXIS 3373); Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Sere., Inc., 500 So. 2d 759 (La.
1987); Glazer v. Comm'n on Ethics for Pub. Empl., 431 So. 2d 752 (La. 1983); Green
v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 668
(1991); Withers v. Timber Products, Inc., 574 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 580 So. 2d 378 (1991): Henry J. Mills Co. v. Crawfish Capitol Seafood, Inc.,
569 So. 2d 1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990); Deroche v. P & L Constr. Materials, Inc.,
554 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 1359 (1990); T.L.
James & Co. v. Kenner Landing, Inc., 550 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), aff'd,
562 So. 2d 914 (1990); Casson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 548 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1989); Chaney v. Godfrey, 535 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Quaglino Tobacco
& Candy Co. v. Barr, 519 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); Sparks v. Progressive
Am. Ins. Co., 517 So. 2d 1036 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 519 So. 2d 106 (1987);
G.I.'s Club of Slidell, Inc. v. American Legion Post No. 374, 504 So. 2d 967 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1987); Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Van Stavern, 496 So. 2d 1360 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 757 (1986); George A. Hormel & Co. v. Ford, 486 So.
2d 927 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); Harris v. Best of Am., Inc., 466 So. 2d 1309 (La.
App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 470 So. 2d 121 (1985); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v, Harper,
430 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
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CONSENSUAL CREDITORS AND LIMITED LIABILITY
The most common form of limited liability case, and the one easiest
to explain from a policy standpoint, is one in which a consensual creditor
of the corporation is seeking to disregard the separate corporate per-
sonality as a means of making a corporate shareholder personally liable
for a debt of the corporation. An excellent example of this type of case
is Abraham v. Lake Forest, Inc."5
The plaintiff in Abraham was a real estate investor who had sold
a real estate option to NEI Corporation, Alabama, a $1,000 subsidiary
of Lake Forest, Inc., which in turn was a subsidiary of NEI Corporation,
a large, publicly-traded real estate development company. Abraham had
purchased the option for $21,000, and resold it to the subsidiary of
Lake Forest for $175,000 in cash and $201,000 in an unsecured prom-
issory note of the subsidiary.56
The subsidiary exercised the option, and mortgaged the property
involved in order to borrow the money needed to buy the property. It
began its improvements on the property, and paid $50,000 to Abraham
under the terms of the promissory note, but later decided to terminate
the project and to sell the property involved. Enough was received on
the resale to repay the mortgage on the property, and to have $33,000
left over. Those funds were paid to the parent corporation in partial
satisfaction of the amounts earlier advanced by the parent company on
the subsidiary's behalf.
No further amounts were paid to Abraham under the note, and he
sued to collect the unpaid amount. He sought to pierce the subsidiary's
veil and to hold its 100°0 parent, and that company's 100% parent (the
ultimate parent company), liable for the unpaid balance of the note.
The facts were undisputed: the subsidiary did observe some corporate
formalities-authorizations occurred through unanimous consents from
its sole shareholder, represented by the shareholder's officers, and it did
keep good inter-company financial records. However, it was also true
that the subsidiary was dominated entirely by officers and employees
of the ultimate parent corporation. It did not receive funds or pay bills
through its own bank account. When bills needed to be paid, the ultimate
parent company paid them. The company had been organized with only
$1,000 in capital and had no other separate funds from which it could
have paid its expenses and obligations, which totaled $790,000. Plainly,
the subsidiary was simply a shell corporation-an instrumentality-through
which the ultimate parent corporation chose to develop this piece of
property. It met its obligations only at the sufferance of the parent
55. 377 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 380 So. 2d 99, 100 (1980).
56. Id. at 466-67. All monetary figures are rounded for simplicity's sake.
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corporation, and its capitalization was woefully inadequate to pay its
bills, including the note to Abraham.
If the true test of veil-piercing was whether this corporation "really"
existed as an independent economic entity, then the veil would surely
have been pierced in this case-but it wasn't. The court did rescind the
$33,000 payment to the parent corporation as an unlawful preference-
an abuse of the parent's control power (and a violation of its fiduciary
duties) to cause the subsidiary to pay its debt before it paid the debt
of an independent third party-and ordered that amount paid to Abra-
ham. But it did not pierce the veil.
In a well-reasoned decision (despite the standard recitation of the
black letter law), the court pointed out that Abraham was a sophisticated
real estate investor who understood perfectly well what risk he was
taking in extending credit to a $1,000 subsidiary corporation, without
getting any parent company guarantees. The court said that he had
engaged in similar financial deals himself, and understood that in ex-
tending credit to the subsidiary, he was essentially agreeing to rely on
the success of the project itseif, rather than on the credit-worthiness of
the lender, as the source of repayment. Had the project succeeded,
Abraham would have been paid as a creditor of the subsidiary, before
the parent corporation was entitled to take out any money in the form
of profit. But because the project failed, he, like the parent company,
did not make as much as hoped." The parent company had done nothing
to violate the terms of their deal, except to take out the $33,000 in
funds remaining after the property involved had been sold.',
These types of cases are easy to explain because they involve the
use of the corporation simply as a convenient vehicle for non-recourse
financing-as a means of identifying and segregating those assets from
which the debt is to be collected. The very same thing could be done
without corporation law (and indeed, it is done without corporation law
where the transaction is relatively simple-mortgaging a single tract of
57. The court surely was influenced by the fact that Abraham had already done quite
well for himself-getting $172,000 in cash up front, representing a $150,000 cash profit
on the option, and had also been paid $50,000 of the remaining $200,000 he had been
promised out of the future revenues of the project.
58. It was understandable that the court would order the return of this amount, for
just as Abraham had agreed to take the risk that he would not be repaid if the project
itself was unsuccessful, so had the parent company, by making him a creditor rather than
an owner of the subsidiary, promised to give him a priority in payment over the equity
interest of the parent. Arguably, that deal was being violated as a result of the parent
taking out the last $33,000 in the corporation. On the other hand, the parent could have
argued that it too was a creditor of the subsidiary, that its extensions of credit were fair
and in good faith, and therefore that its claim should not have been subordinated to
Abraham's as it was.
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land, for example) except for the difficulties associated with "pinning
down" the assets from which the debt will be paid. 9
The corporation in these cases acts as a sort of fictional "box" or
"holding tank" for the assets that are to be subjected to the debt. If
a creditor understands that he is to be paid only out of corporate assets,
and not out of the personal assets of the corporate shareholders, and
he agrees to extend credit on that basis, then there is absolutely no
reason why a court should allow him out of the terms of his contract
simply because the corporation is in some sense not a truly independent
and free-standing economic organization, or because the shareholders
and directors have failed to hold enough meetings.
This is simple contract law-enforcing the terms as agreed to by
the parties. One of the important uses of corporations is in financial
arrangements in which one or more different corporations are deliberately
and openly used as simple devices for segregating one pool of assets
and claims from another within a larger business enterprise. Of the
many dozens of reported veil-piercing cases covered by this article,w° not
one of them involving a claim by a consensual creditor has pierced the
veil simply because the obligor corporation was a controlled shell or
instrumentality.
PIERCING IN CONSENSUAL CREDITOR CASES
The results in the reported cases strongly support the "implied
nonrecourse clause" theory of veil piercing in contract cases. Regardless
of how informally managed or how thinly capitalized a corporation may
be, the last half-century of reported cases in Louisiana" suggest that
the appellate courts in this state normally do not allow veil-piercing to
be used as a device for imposing personal liability on corporate share-
holders for consensual corporate debts. Piercing does sometimes occur,
but only where one or more of the following four characteristics are
present:
1. The creditor is. less sophisticated than Abraham62-is a trade
creditor or consumer, for example, or is relatively less sophis-
ticated than the corporate shareholder in terms of corporate
59. See Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliate Corporations, 43 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 499, 501-07 (1976).
60. See supra note 7.
61. See supra note 7.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58, concerning Abraham v. Lake Forest,
Inc., 377 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 380 So. 2d 99, 100 (1980).
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finance;63
2. A single shareholder controls a number of different cor-
porations, and moves assets back and forth between the various
corporations; 64
3. The shareholder has deliberately stripped the corporation of
assets, knowing that it is about to face liability, or has delib-
erately placed a particular contract or obligation in a shell
corporation because he knows that the contract is going to be
breached, and does not want to be personally liable (nor lose
any substantial assets) as a result of the liability that he knows
will arise;65 and/or
63. E.g., Troyer v. Webster Homes, Inc., 566 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 571 So. 2d 650, 651 (1990); Terry v. Guillory, 538 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1989); Egudin v. Carriage Court Condominium, Dehrviil Group, Inc., 528 So. 2d 1043
(La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 532 So. 2d 136 (1988); LeBlanc v. Opt, Inc., 421 So.
2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 438 and 429 So. 2d 132 (1983);
Hebert v. Wiegand, 207 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
64. E.g., Green v. Champion Ins. Co. 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 580 So. 2d 668 (1991); Entech Systems Corp. v. Gaffney, 466 So. 2d 788 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1985) (summ. judg. rev'd); LeBlanc v. Opt, Inc., 421 So. 2d 984 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 438 and 429 So. 2d 132 (1983). Cf., Lucey
Mfg. Corp. v. Oil City Iron Works, 15 La. App. 12, 131 So. 57 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930)
(affiliated corporations with identical names, incorporated in different states and char-
acterized as "branches" on firm stationery, caused third party who was creditor of one
corporation and debtor of another to believe that all corporations were a single firm-
third party allowed to set off one debt against the other and to hold the affiliate liable
for the deficiency). For a further explanation of these cases, and for citations of cases
in which multiple corporations have not resulted in piercing, see infra note 68. For
citations to a debate about the wisdom of respecting separate corporate personalities within
a group of affiliated corporations, see supra note 5.
65. The importance of unexplained asset transfers is illustrated in Riggins v. Dixie
Shoring Co., No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (1991 WL 255914, 1991 LEXIS 3373)
where the supreme court reversed a decision in favor of piercing on grounds, among
others, that an alleged "disappearance" of assets appeared not to have occurred. For
cases that pierce the veil based on illicit asset transfers, see, e.g., George A. Hormel &
Co. v. Ford, 486 So. 2d 927 (La. App. ist Cir. 1986) (shareholders emptied corporate
bank account so that check sent in payment for. meat would not clear, after learning that
employee had stolen the meat); Watson v. Big T Timber Co. 382 So. 2d 258 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1980) (knowing that title problems existed, and that prospective purchaser was
insisting on warranty deed, shareholder quitclaimed land to shell corporation, and had
shell corporation sell through a warranty deed). Cf., Hebert v. Wiegand, 207 So. 2d 882
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) (shareholder caused corporation to sell house to creditor of
corporation after already selling under unrecorded contract for deed to homeowner). But
see, American Bank of Welch v. Smith Aviation, Inc., 433 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1983) (shareholders issued check in good faith, with sufficient funds in account, but
over five months later-as a result of bank's mixup-no longer had enough to pay check
as well as other corporate debts, so kept funds in corporate account so low that check
would not clear-willing to pay eventually, when the money came in, but unable to pay
at the time without cash-flow problems-court refused to pierce).
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4. The extension of credit to the corporation has been procured
at least partly as the result of some false representation made
personally by the defendant shareholder or officer (in some cases,
the courts treat these fraudulent representations as personal torts
of the shareholders or officers, so that piercing is not seen as
necessary, and in other cases, the personal fraud is used to
justify the piercing)."
These four "exceptions" to the general rule, that the courts will
not pierce for the benefit of a consensual creditor, actually help prove
the general rule: where a creditor has agreed to look only to the assets
of the corporation for his payment, that agreement will be enforced
unless, in some rough sense, the creditor should not be expected to
understand the nature of his agreement, or the corporate shareholder
has either committed fraud or violated the implied contractual obligation
of good faith.
Thus, in the usual case, the courts do enforce the terms of the
contract between the parties, without much regard to so-called "cor-
porate" formalities. But in cases involving commingling of assets, poor
financial record-keeping, or a complicated series of self-dealing trans-
actions among a number of affiliated entities, piercing the veil doctrine
serves the courts functionally as a sort of "res ipsa loquitur" remedy
for corporate creditors who would otherwise be forced to prove the
unlawfulness of many separate transactions in the face of poor or
nonexistent records. Veil-piercing doctrine allows a court to dispense
with the complicated, difficult proof of a series of limited, particularized
abuses-with limited remedies-and instead, based on a general pattern
of poor records or potentially abusive transactions, simply to impose
personal liability for the obligations involved directly on the shareholder
who was responsible for the confusion.67 That may seem at first to be
66. E.g., Terry v. Guillory, 538 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Egudin v.
Carriage Court Condominium, Dehrvill Group, Inc., 528 So. 2d 1043 (La. App. 5th Cir.),
writ denied, 532 So. 2d 136 (1988); Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. American Chem., Inc., 461
So. 2d 1063 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 480 So. 2d 730 (1986); Dolese Concrete
Co. v. Tessitore, 357 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied. 359 So. 2d 620, 623
(1978); Smith-Hearron v. Frazier, Inc., 352 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ
denied, 353 So. 2d 1337 (1978); Altex Ready-Mixed Concrete Corp. v. Employers.Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co., 308 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 312 So. 2d
872 (1975); Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Hughes-Walsh Co., 246 So. 2d 872 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1971) (check kiting).
67. See Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 505, 540-53 (1977). Cf., Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations,
43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 499, 520-22 (1976) (arguing for veil-piercing where controlling person
of corporation has organized its affairs in a way that unnecessarily increases information
costs to prospective creditors, and who are thereby misled about the assets available for
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a rather rough form of justice, but it may be the only kind of justice
that a court may realistically be capable of providing if the corporate
shareholder has mixed things up by failing to comply with normal
standards of record-keeping and asset segregation.
Moreover, despite the relative ease with which a veil-piercing decision
might theoretically be justified under the prevailing doctrine, Louisiana
courts do indeed seem reluctant to utilize the doctrine in cases that
appear to them to involve routine business failures. Where a person has
operated his business through a single corporation," and has appeared
the payment of their claims). For examples of these types of cases in Louisiana, see Green
v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 668
(1991); George A. Hormel & Co. v. Ford, 486 So. 2d 927 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986);
Entech Sys. Corp. v. Gaffney, 466 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (summ. judg.
rev'd); LeBlanc v. Opt, Inc., 421 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427
So. 2d 438 and 429 So. 2d 132 (1983). Compare these cases with, e.g., Amp Serv. Corp.
v. Richard, 419 So. 2d 911 (La. 1982) (preferential transfer of security interest to share-
holder/creditors, to prejudice of arms' length unsecured creditors, though subject to attack
as unlawful preference, not an unlawful dividend within meaning of La. R.S. 12:93);
Dooley v. Wright, 501 So. 2d 980 (La. App. 2d Cir.) (liability for unlawful distribution),
writ denied, 512 So. 2d 442 (1987); Peters v. Crochet Homes, Inc., 370 So. 2d 651 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1979) (liability for unlawful distribution).
68. Where several affiliated corporations are used in a shareholder's overall business
operations, a shareholder should be prepared to explain in a simple, understandable fashion
why additional corporations were used, and what types of legitimate, consistent policies
governed inter-company transactions. Where it appears that multiple corporations have
been used in something of a shell game, with complicated, frequent movements of assets
from one company to another, and without any credible and consistent business explanation
for these myriad transactions, Louisiana courts have been quite willing to use veil-piercing
doctrine to cut through the mess. On the other hand, where some new business venture
has been placed in a separate corporation, and consistently treated as a separate business
venture from a financial standpoint. Louisiana courts have been willing to recognize the
affiliate's limited liability for the debts of that new venture, even if a few isolated examples
of wrongful, correctable, self-dealing have occurred. Compare Green v. Champion Ins.
Co., 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 668 (1991); LeBlanc
v. Opt, Inc., 421 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 438 and
429 So. 2d 132 (1983) (shell game cases-veil pierced) with Stephenson v. List Laundry
& Dry Cleaners, Inc., 186 La. 11, 171 So. 556 (1936) (tort case; veil not pierced between
affiliated corporations operating separate laundry establishments in different cities); Central
Business Forms, Inc. v. N-Sure Systems, Inc., 540 So. 2d 1029 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989)
(veil not pierced as a result of private reorganization of financially troubled business,
involving transfer of assets from one controlled corporation to another, leaving behind
unsecured creditor claims, where assets transferred worth less than amount owed on loan
that they secured, and where the first corporation was given a "royalty" interest in profits
produced by assets in transferee corporation); Abraham v. Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d
465 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (veil of undercapitalized second-tier subsidiary, established
to develop a tract of land, not pierced where development project itself failed financially,
but preferential payment on parent debt was rescinded and parent debt was effectively
subordinated to that of third party creditor), writ denied, 380 So. 2d 99 (1980); Johansen
v. Port Jewell, Inc., 351 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (court refused to pierce to pay
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to run the company in good faith, as if he intended to cause it to pay
its bills as long as financially feasible, the courts are liberal in protecting
him from personal liability to others who are equally or more sophis-
ticated about the financing and operations of small business corporations.
That is true even where the corporation is run as most small business
corporations are-virtually as proprietorships-with flexibility as to in-
vestments and withdrawals by the controlling shareholder and without
much attention to corporate formalities, beyond the maintenance of a
separate bank account and financial records 9 Managerial informality,
unaccompanied by financial confusion, appears to create relatively low
levels of risk as far as consensual creditors are concerned, 70 while cor-
porate formalities alone appear not to protect against veil piercing where
a court is convinced that financial misdealings or other inequities have
occurred.7
LIMITED LIABILITY AND TORT VICTIMS
Surprisingly perhaps, .there are relatively few Louisiana decisions that
discuss the issue of corporate limited liability in the context of a tort
suit for the recovery of personal injury damages. Out of the 117 veil-
salaries of employees of corporation organized to develop marina where marina project
itself failed financially), application not considered, 352 So. 2d 705 (1977).
69. See, e.g., Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (1991
WL 255914, 1991 LEXIS 3373); Sea Tang Fisheries, Inc. v. You'll See Sea Foods, Inc.,
569 So. 2d 992 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 89 (1991); Henry J.
Mills Co. v. Crawfish Capitol Seafood, Inc., 569 So. 2d 1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990);
West Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Daley, 476 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Harris v.
Best of Am., Inc., 466 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 470 So.. 2d 121
(1985); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper, 430 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983);
Ceco Corp. v. R & M Industries, Inc., 416 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir.), amended,
425 So. 2d 709 (1982); Kingsman Enterprises, Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d
1280 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. The bigger danger for the owners of
small business corporations is that they will neglect to make it clear in their business
transactions that they are acting strictly as agents for their corporations. It is tempting
for sole shareholders of small business corporations to tell others that "they"-the share-
holders-are the owners of the businesses involved, and to make deals without expressly
disclosing their status as agents of their corporations. This can result in personal liability
under an undisclosed agency theory without any need for the creditor to attack the way
in which the corporation is run generally. See, e.g., Miller v. Thompson, 542 So. 2d 96
(La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 544 So. 2d 407 (1989); G.T.M. Carpet Co. v. Richards,
534 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
71. See, e.g., Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 580 So. 2d 668 (1991); LeBlanc v. Opt, Inc., 421 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 438 and 429 So. 2d 132 (1983); Watson v. Big T Timber
Co., 382 So. 2d 258 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Smith-Hearron v. Frazier, Inc., 352 So.
2d 263 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 353 So. 2d 1337 (1978).
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piercing cases covered by this article,712 only nine deal with this issue.7"
Ten more deal with similar issues, in the context of a workers' com-
pensation or Jones Act claim.74 Two of these remaining ten cases were
actually "reverse" veil-piercing cases, in which the defendant shareholder
sought to have the court disregard the separate existence of controlled
corporations, so that he or another corporation could assert the pierced
corporation's "employer" status-and immunity-against the plaintiff."
This low number of veil-piercing cases in the personal injury context
may reflect, a widespread use of liability insurance in business opera-
tions, 6 or larger numbers of pre-appeal settlements in tort contexts due
to a perceived difficulty in defending corporate limited liability against
personal injury claimants. In black letter theory, of course, the nature
of the claimant should make no real difference; the "totality of cir-
cumstances" is supposed to be considered, but none of the factors
commonly recited by the courts mentions the nature of the claimant
72. See supra note 7.
73. Stephenson v. List Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., 186 La. II, 171 So. 556 (1936);
Sparks v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 517 So. 2d 1036 (La. App. 3dCir.), writ denied,
519 So. 2d 106 (1987); Giuffria v. Red River Barge Lines, Inc., 452 So. 2d 793 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 118 (1984); Landry v. St. Charles Inn, Inc., 446
So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Giddings v. John Hearnsberger Co., 403 So. 2d
849 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Dillman v. Nobles, 351 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1977); Sampay v. Davis, 342 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Ogaard v. Wiley,
325 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Robicheaux v. Frederick, 257 So. 2d 183 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1972).
74. Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Service, Inc., 500 So. 2d 759 (La. 1987); Withers v.
Timber Products, Inc., 574 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 378
(1991); Cormier v. Guilbeaux, 547 So. 2d 17 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 551 So.
2d 633 (1989); Rivers v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 389 So. 2d 807 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1980) (Jones Act); McGregor v. United Film Corp., 351 So. 2d 1224 (La. App.
ist Cir. 1977), writ denied, 353 So. 2d 1335, 1341 (1978); Lushute v. Diesi, 343 So. 2d
1132 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 354 So. 2d 179 (1977); McClendon v.
Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 340 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Cole v. Golemi,
271 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1964); Brown v. Benton Creosoting Co., 147 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
75. Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 759 (La. 1987) (defendant un-
successful); Cormier v. Guilbeaux, 547 So. 2d 17 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (defendant unsuc-
cessful), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 633 (1989).
76. The fact that the owner of an incorporated business is not personally liable for
the debts of his business does not mean that he is indifferent to the losses that his
business may suffer. If he has made any substantial investment in the assets of the business
(either directly through equity contributions or indirectly through personal guarantees of
corporate borrowings), then he is going to care a great deal whether he has adequate
insurance coverage to prevent the loss of those assets, whether the loss arises from a fire
or from a personal injury lawsuit. It seems likely, therefore, that most owners of businesses
that require much in the way of undistributed assets are going to have an adequate
incentive to purchase liability insurance for their business regardless of the effects that
insurance, or lack of insurance, might have in the area of corporate veil-piercing.
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involved. On the surface, at least, the controlling factors are supposed
to be the same in a tort case as in a contract case, and the key question
is whether the corporation "really" existed as a true, separate business
organization in some abstract sense of the term.
But the questions posed by a tort case are quite different from those
raised in a contract case. Corporate limited liability in a contract setting
may be seen as an implied nonrecourse clause in the creditor's contract
with the corporation; the relevant questions, therefore, are:
1. Whether the creditor should be deemed to have understood
and consented to this arrangement,
2. Whether the creditor's consent had been vitiated by fraud,
and/or
3. Whether the corporate shareholder has complied with the
requirements of good faith management of the corporation that
may be treated as implicit conditions to the creditor's agreement
to look only to the corporation's assets for payment."
The tort victim, in contrast has not agreed to extend credit to the
corporation for his personal injuries; he has had the role of corporate
creditor thrust upon him involuntarily. If corporate shareholders are to
be protected against limited liability in this context, it is not because
the creditor has agreed to look only to corporate assets for the payment
of his claim. Rather, limited liability in this setting must be seen as
being imposed on the creditor, by operation of law, just as the tort
duty on which the plaintiff's suit is based in the first place is imposed
by society on the defendant(s) in the case.
Why would society choose to impose the costs of corporate limited
liability on a nonconsenting personal injury victim? The standard answer
is that society wishes to encourage the growth of commerce and industry,
through the raising of the necessary corporate capital, by permitting
investors to hazard only a limited, predictable portion of their assets."
The theory is that the denial of limited liability would not so much
result in the full compensation of persons injured by a business, as it
would result in the lack of the business operation in the first place: if
investors could contribute capital to a business only by risking their
entire personal fortune, investments in all but the safest and most
predictable of enterprises would dry up. An implicit policy decision
apparently has been made to have society as a whole (or, more accurately,
to have a few members of society, chosen at random) bear at least
77. See supra text accompanying notes 63-71.
78. See, e.g., Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., No. 91-C-0963 (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (1991
WL 255914, 1991 LEXIS 3373); Glazer v. Comm'n on Ethics for Public Employees, 431
So. 2d 752 (La. 1983).
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some of the unexpected risks of an incorporated business enterprise. 79
The limitation of liability provided by corporation law directly con-
flicts with general tort law policies which try to prevent the externali-
zation of the true risks and costs of a given business enterprise; limited
liability has absolutely no operative effect except to externalize the risks
and costs of a business. 0 When a court considers a veil-piercing question
in the context of a personal injury case, therefore, it is unavoidably
being asked to decide how to balance the law's policy in favor of
compensating tort victims-and of making a business enterprise bear the
true risks of its operations-against the competing legal policy that favors
capital formation in corporations by denying full recovery to the cor-
poration's creditors, and by allowing the externalization of at least some
of the personal injury costs associated with that corporation's business.
It is difficult to say in these kinds of cases exactly where the
encouragment of capital formation should yield to the injuries of an
innocent person, but one thing seems clear: if the purpose of providing
limited liability is to encourage business investment, a shareholder's claim
to limited liability ought not be respected as against a personal injury
claimant where he has invested little or nothing in the risk-producing
corporation. Where a shareholder has failed to provide adequately for
the personal injury claims that are virtually certain to arise in the ordinary
course of the corporation's business8 it seems nonsensical to say that
the balance between the competing policies of internalization of risks,
on the one hand, and the encouragement of capital formation, on the
other, ought to be struck in favor of limited liability.
This result would serve neither policy well; rather, it would deny
recovery to a personal injury claimant in order to protect-indeed to
encourage-clearly and predictably inadequate levels of capital formation
79. Some commentators have questioned whether limited liability should be recognized
against tort claimants. See supra note 5.
80. In one sense, limited liability always externalizes business risks, regardless of
whether the creditor who' ultimately gets stuck with the unpaid bill is consensual or
nonconsensual in nature; either way the creditor, rather than the owner of the business,
ends up paying part of the costs of operating that business. However, a consensual creditor
always has the ability to deny credit to the corporation unless he is promised a price for
his extension of credit that compensates him for the risk that he might not be paid.
Thus, when dealing with a consensual creditor, a corporation really is not able to externalize
its costs. It pays for the risks of nonpayment.
A tort victim cannot withhold or price his extension of credit in this way; to the extent
that a corporate shareholder is permitted to avoid personal liability on a corporate personal
injury obligation, the shareholder is clearly being permitted to reap the economic benefits
of the business without bearing all its costs. See Posnqr, The Rights of Creditors of
Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 499, 501-07, 519-20 (1976).
81. See Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961);
Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966) (dissenting
opinion of Keating, J.).
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for the type of business involved. Taken to an extreme, if limited liability
in a personal injury case were not linked to some good faith effort on
the part of the shareholder to provide adequate financial protection for
the types of injuries that commonly occur in the kind of business
involved, then the law's provision of limited liability would depend
strictly on empty formalisms, i.e., on the filing of certain documents
with the Secretary of State, and the maintenance of separate books,
records and corporate decision-making procedures. Regardless of the
degree to which a corporation has complied with the law's formality
and "separate existence" requirements, therefore, it seems unlikely that
most courts would be sympathetic to an assertion of limited liability in
a personal injury case by the controlling shareholder of an under-insured,
thinly capitalized shell. Conversely, if a shareholder has provided rea-
sonable levels of insurance or capital, then in light of the law's policy
in favor of capital formation', it seems likely that a court would be
willing to protect the shareholder against personal liability for claims
that are out of the ordinary, either as to type or size.
If this is true, then corporation law might be seen as providing a
rather generous "umbrella" insurance policy against a shareholder's
personal liability for business-related personal injury claims. (The cor-
porate assets, of course, would remain subject to the claim, so that the
corporation itself-if it owns valuable assets-would normally have an
incentive to obtain its own insurance.8 2 ) The personal liability umbrella
would be unlimited in amount and would be provided virtually free of
charge, 3 but would be available only if reasonable levels of primary
coverage were maintained. The shareholder would bear responsibility for
covering the ordinary expenses of his business, including ordinary tort
claims, and society's subsidy of the capital formation process would be
limited to protecting investors against extraordinary claims.
PIERCING- RESULTS IN TORT CASES
The few piercing cases that exist in the personal injury area do
provide some limited support for the theory that levels of capitalization
and insurance in relation to the nature of the injuries suffered are the
important factors in predicting whether a court will pierce the veil in
a tort case-much more important than corporate formalities. Compare
two cases decided in the mid 1980's: Giuffria v. Red River Barge Lines,
Inc., s4 and Sparks v. Progressive American Insurance Co. 5
82. See supra note 76.
83. There are some corporate filing fees and franchise taxes to pay, but little or no
extra income tax if the corporation is an S corporation.
84. 452 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 118 (1984).
85. 517 So. 2d 1036 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 519 So. 2d 106 (1987).
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In Giuffria, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's piercing
of the veil of a 72o subsidiary corporation to its parent company. The
court recited a list of "factors" that seemed typical of informally man-
aged, closely-held corporations:
1. 72% stock ownership;
2. same president, who served without additional compensation
for his services to the subsidiary;
3. no corporate minutes, and no corporate meetings in the
preceding four years;
4. no corporate tax return in one year; and
5. $200,000 in loans by the parent to the subsidiary.
These factors certainly are of the type typically recited in veil-piercing
cases, but there are many cases in which similar, or even greater, levels
of informality have not resulted in veil-piercing. 6 It would appear that
it was the subsidiary's lack of insurance that made the difference: the
parent corporation was operating an uninsured truck through its sub-
sidiary, perhaps hoping that the limited liability of corporation law
would substitute for insurance. It didn't.
In the Sparks case, on the other hand, both the trial court and the
appellate court refused to pierce the veil of a trucking corporation that
had been incorporated just days before the driver of the corporation's
truck rear-ended the plaintiff. Sparks involved a business that was op-
erated as a proprietorship before the accident (the truck was purchased,
the driver hired, and an aggregate-hauling business was begun, all before
incorporation). Judging from the complete lack of corporate meetings
after the accident, and the fact that the lawyer for the sole shareholder
of the corporation challenged only the shareholder's liability-never
challenging the liability of his client's wholly-owned corporation-ap-
parently little was ever done to give the corporation any real economic
or organizational existence. Once the accident occurred, it seems likely
that the corporation was "cut loose" and allowed to bear liability without
much of a fight, because the real client-the shareholder-had little to
lose if the new, completely uncapitalized corporation were to be held
liable. Nevertheless, neither the trial court nor the appellate court would
pierce the veil. This was a company that died aborning, yet both courts
saw in it enough vitality to protect the shareholder from liability.
86. E.g., West Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Daley, 476 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1985); Harris v. Best of Am., Inc., 466 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied,
470 So. 2d 121 (1985); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper, 430 So. 2d 143 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1983); Ceco Corp. v. R & M Indus., Inc., 416 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
amended, 425 So. 2d 709 (1982); Kingsman Enterprises, Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339
So. 2d 1280 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
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The difference between Sparks and Giuffria seemed to be that the
owner of the trucking business in Sparks had acquired a $100,000 liability
policy for the truck when he owned it personally, and that the insurer
had stipulated coverage for the truck notwithistanding the later incor-
poration. This insurance was adequate to compensate the plaintiff fully
for about $17,200 in medical expenses and $2,300 in property damages,
plus $79,500 or so out of the $150,000 awarded to him as general
damages. Moreover, this was the amount of insurance that the share-
holder had purchased when he was operating the business personally,
as a proprietorship; he did not seem to be using the corporation as a
substitute for insurance, but as extra protection, on top of the amount
of insurance he thought it necessary to have when he knew that he
could face personal liability.
There are other explanations for these two cases, of course:
1. Giuffria pierced to another corporation, not an individual,
while Sparks would have resulted in personal liability for an
individual;
2. The corporation in Sparks had not been operating long
enough to "ignore" corporate formalities (it simply hadn't had
time to observe them), while the parent corporation in Giuffria
had virtually ignored formalities for at least four years; and
3. In both cases, the appellate court was simply deferring to
the finding of'the trial court; one just happened to be different
from the other.
Still, one must explain why the trial court would be more sympathetic
in one case than in another, and why it would matter much to a court
whether corporate formalities-whose observance or nonobservance had
nothing to do in either case with the plaintiff's ability to collect his
damages-were ignored because of a lack of time or a lack of interest,
and, finally, why a court should be less concerned with an individual
who was operating an uninsured truck than with a corporation that was
doing the same thing.
It certainly cannot be proven that insurance made the difference,
but that seems the best explanation (other than random chance or the
personal predilections of the judges involved). In one case the defendant
had made no effort to make its corporation financially responsible to
tort claimants-and indeed had chosen to characterize its capital con-
tributions as loans, rather than equity contributions, so that it actually
would have competed as a creditor with the tort claimant for any
remaining assets of the corporation. In the other case, before he had
incorporated his business, when he was personally at risk, the defendant
had purchased what most laypersons would probably consider to be a
reasonable amount of insurance. It seems clear that the former type of
arrangement is not the type that corporation law is designed to promote-
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an externalization of all personal injury costs, with little or no equity
investment-while the latter type of situation is exactly the sort of good
faith entrepreneurship that corporate limited liability is designed to en-
courage."
Two other cases that have pierced the veil in a personal injury
setting are Dillman v. Nobles", and Ogaard v. Wiley.89 The piercing in
Dillman was consistent with the black letter theory of indistinguishability,
but it also fits with the patterns suggested in this discussion of under-
capitalization and lack of insurance, coupled with a failure to maintain
a separate set of financial (as distinguished from corporate) records for
the business.
It seems probable that the separate identity of a reasonably-insured
corporation, with decent books and records, would have been respected
in Dillman despite the lack of corporate formalities, for the presence
or absence of these formalities would have had no bearing on either
the personal injury risks or the corporate insolvency risks posed to the
patrons of the lounge. The plaintiff in Dillman had suffered $3,500 in
personal injury damages as a result of the collapse of a chair in the
defendant's lounge/dancehall. The defendant argued that his corporation,
rather than he personally, owned and operated the dancehall, but both
the trial and appellate courts pierced the veil, citing the following factors:
1. The lack of shareholder and director meetings-the share-
holder could not name the directors of the corporation, and
when he testified that 290 board meetings had been held, it
turned out that he was referring to weekly meetings between
himself and the employees of the lounge.
2. The lack of a corporate bank account-when asked to produce
documentation of corporate transactions, the defendant share-
holder produced only cancelled checks from his personal account.
3. The use of a cash accounting system, operated primarily
through the lounge cash register over which the defendant had
unfettered control, and from which he said that he withdrew
$200 weekly, as his sole source of support; the bookkeeper used
whatever figures the defendant gave him as to business receipts;
and the acquisition of the lease for the lounge, and some of
the lounge's licenses and permits in the name of the shareholder
personally.
87. It also seems likely that a court would be willing to be fairly lenient with nonexpert
assessments of the amount of insurance that would be required, but more demanding of
persons who know or should know more about the types of risks that they are likely to
face. The Sparks court might have been less tolerant had a multi-million dollar trucking
firm purchased only a $100,000 policy for a subsidiary trucking corporation.
88. 351 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
89. 325 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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The reported decision does not cite the lack of insurance as a factor
in the decision, but it appears that no insurance coverage existed: only
"ABC Insurance Co." is named in the caption of the case, the text of
the decision does not mention any insurance coverage or the rendering
of any judgment for or against an insurer, and it seems unlikely that
the veil-piercing issue would have been pursued through an appeal to
recover on a $3,500 claim, surely within the coverage limits of even the
most modest of liability policies.
The other case, Ogaard, was an especially tragic personal injury
case in which the court treated one corporation as the alter ego of a
sister corporation as a means of gaining access to the sister corporation's
umbrella liability policy. The "pierced" corporation was the employer
of a driver who, in the course and scope of his employment as a driver
of a tandem truck, had negligently struck the back of a pickup truck,
crushing it into a tree and killing twelve persons, at least ten of them
children, who were riding in the pickup on their way to a swimming
party. The court noted that the "[blodies of some of the occupants
were found crushed at the scene and others were along the vehicles'
route."
The two corporations involved were owned and managed by the
same individuals, one as a farming business and the other as a related
mill operation that did business principally with the farm and with the
farm's tenants. The pierced corporation did maintain a $300,000 general
liability policy, as well as a $40,000 policy on the truck, but the sister
corporation not only had its own general liability policy,, but also an
umbrella policy. The court recited the following factors in affirming the
trial court's piercing of the veil:
1. capitalization of $1,000;
2. common shareholders and officers;
3. the conduct of business principally with the sister corpo-
ration;
4. the same post office box;
5. use by one corporation of funds borrowed in the name of
the other corporation;
6. the mill corporation-the pierced corporation-was said not
to be expected to make a profit.
These do not seem to be factors indicating that the shareholders
had in any way "abused" the corporate form of business, and it does
not appear that the shareholders had been financially irresponsible in
their insurance arrangements. Indeed, it appears that the disputes in the
case involved strictly questions among the various insurers; it does not
90. Id. at 646.
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appear that the corporation that was held liable was actually going to
find it necessary to pay a judgment not covered by insurance. Func-
tionally, therefore, the effect of piercing in this case was to provide
insurance coverage that the contract of insurance might not otherwise
have provided. This was more a question of the interpretation of in-
surance contracts than the imposition of personal liability on a corporate
shareholder.
It would not have been difficult to predict the result in this case,
but one must wonder whether the result would have been the same had
the sister corporation not had sufficient insurance to cover the liability;
if, in effect, the shareholders of this corporation would indirectly have
become poorer (through their corporation's payment of the tort claim)
as a result of the veil-piercing.
INSURANCE AND AFFILIATES
The Ogaard case raises two important questions about the factors
that ought to be considered important in veil-piercing cases, particularly
those involving tort claimants: the relationship of insurance and capi-
talization, and the relevance of shared facilities among affiliated com-
panies.
As indicated earlier, 9' it is difficult to see why mere formal com-
pliance with the corporation statute should shield a shareholder from
personal liability to a personal injury victim where the shareholder has
set up a thinly-capitalized, uninsured shell company whose operations
will obviously pose risks of personal injury to third parties. That sort
of protection for shareholders would eliminate most incentives to operate
their businesses in a way that minimized risks of personal injury, and
it would allow the owners and profit-takers in the business to shift
virtually all risks of loss from their enterprise to innocent third persons.
On the other hand, however, it seems difficult to justify a nonre-
cognition of limited liability, no matter how low the capitalization and
no matter how many other of the traditional veil-piercing factors are
present, if adequate levels of insurance are maintained by the responsible
corporations. As far as a tort claimant is concerned, a company's
insurance coverage acts as an especially desirable form of capitalization,
independent of management formalities or the capital or earnings retained
by the company for other purposes, and the incentive to maintain and/
or reduce the costs of this insurance will create an incentive for the
reduction of the risks of injury posed by the operation of the insured
business.9
91. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
92. If it does not seem obvious how insurance is actually superior to other forms
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Certainly, a court ought not consider it relevant, as Ogaard did,
that the affiliated companies have shared the same post office box;
separate post office boxes could not conceivably make any difference
in whether a personal injury claimant is going to recover his damages.93
It is hardly surprising, or sinister in implication, that two or more
commonly-owned businesses might share common business resources,
such as post office boxes, office facilities, clerical or professional staffing,
or even bank accounts. Such practices are common in business and
actually ought to be encouraged to the extent that the sharing results
in operational efficiencies rather than in disguised revenue diversions
from one affiliate to another.
The real danger posed to creditors of affiliated organizations is that
the controlling persons of the affiliated entities will cause assets to be
diverted from one company to another through self-dealing transactions
that harm the interests of the transferor company's creditors.94 In the
Ogaard case, for example, the court found that the common owners of
the two companies operated the mill on virtually a non-profit basis,
of capitalization from the standpoint of the tort claimant, consider the situation in Ogaard
v. Wiley, 325 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975). Compare the value of a $300,000
tort claim against a company with a net worth of $340,000, but with no insurance coverage
for the claim, as compared with the same size claim against a company with zero net
worth, but covered by a $340,000 insurance policy with a reputable, solvent insurer.
Surely the latter claim is more valuable than the former: the payment of the claim is
a routine matter for the insurance company, which will have the cash resources to do
so, while a payment by the uninsured company out of its own capital threatens its very
existence. The owners of the company are likely to resist such a claim even more vigorously
than they might normally, both on the merits and through attempted transfers of assets
out of the company. Even though the claim may eventually be proven, and unlawful
transfers reversed, at its very best the process of securing and enforcing the judgment in
this case is going to be much more time-consuming and expensive than the collection of
the claim from the insurer. The tort claimant might well end up with considerably less
than $300,000 for his claim, even though, in theory, the company had assets sufficient
to cover such a claim. Thus, even in a case such as Ogaard, where the veil-piercing
factors certainly supported a conclusion that the two companies had been operated es-
sentially as separately-incorporated divisions of a single, commonly-owned enterprise, the
separate identities of the two companies ought not be disregarded if each of them has
maintained liability insurance appropriate to the type of business being operated by each.
93. This is a particularly striking example of one of the weaknesses of the "factors"
approach in the black letter law. Factors are listed without any attention being paid to
their importance relative to other factors, and without any concern for any causal con-
nection between the factor listed and the loss suffered by the plaintiff. The causal element
only appears to be satisfied through the theoretical relationship between veil-piercing and
corporate separateness, liability being imposed if the corporations are not truly separate.
But since separateness is fictional to begin with, it makes no sense to make a liability
decision based in part on the rather unsurprising discovery that affiliated companies often
share common facilities.
94. See Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions
in Bankruptcy, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 589, 591-97 (1975).
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"choosing" to sell its services to the farming operation at prices too
low to produce any profits to the mill. That would clearly harm the
interests of creditors of the mill, for it would mean that the farm was
getting all of the economic benefit of the mill operation, without the
mill's building up any retained earnings that might have been available
to creditors, simply by causing the mill to supply its services at an
unprofitable price. Obviously, that would not have occurred had the
mill and the farm been independent companies, selling their products
and services strictly in arms-length transactions." Similar concerns seem
to have prompted the Champion Insurance and LeBlanc courts to pierce
the veil even where the claim of a consensual creditor was concerned. 9
Nevertheless, as long as adequate liability insurance is maintained
by the responsible corporations, it does not seem wrongful-as far as
a tort claimant is concerned-to shift revenues through affiliate self-
dealing. If the owners of affiliated corporations wish to meet their tort
obligations by hiring an insurance company to expose its capital, rather
than by leaving their own capital at risk in the company, that should
be of no concern to the tort claimant; the owners have made adequate
financial arrangements as far as he is concerned.
If it turns out that self-dealing between, affiliates has injured some
other creditor (such as a consensual creditor whose claim is not covered
by insurance), then that creditor might well be entitled to challenge the
practice in his own suit.97 But neither the affiliation itself nor the self-
dealing ought to be considered relevant to the tort claimant's effort to
pierce, as long as those factors have not resulted in a failure by the
owners to keep their companies capable (through insurance arrangements
or otherwise) of paying the size and kind of tort claims that ordinarily
arise in those types of businesses. If adequate insurance has not been
maintained, of course, then inter-company self-dealing poses as much
danger to the tort claimant as it does to any other creditor of the
corporation.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES
As with personal injury cases generally, there are few Louisiana
cases that discuss the issue of disregarding the limited liability of share-
95. However, even if the firms had dealt with each other on an arm's length basis,
the fact that each would be attempting to maximize its profits would not necessarily mean
that either of them would be inclined to retain those profits in the business, putting them
at risk for the benefit of creditors, rather than distributing them to the extent they could
lawfully do so.
96. Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
580 So. 2d 668 (1991); LeBlanc v. Opt, Inc., 421 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982),
writ denied, 427 So. 2d 438 and 429 So. 2d 132 (1983). See supra text accompanying
note 64.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 62-71.
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holders in workers' compensation cases;" most employers appear to
purchase the necessary insurance. Where that does not occur, however,
and the question is whether to impose personal liability on the share-
holder for the workers' compensation claim, there would appear to be
no reason to distinguish a normal personal injury claim from a claim
arising under workers' compensation law. In neither case should a court
allow a shareholder to externalize the risks of his business without
providing in some reasonable way for those liabilities that commonly
arise in the type of business involved. Two cases have pierced the veil
in that type of situation." Three others have refused to pierce the veil,
one where personal liability was imposed under a personal negligence
theory anyway,'00 another where some form of insurance did seem to
be available,' 0' and the third without providing information on capi-
talization or insurance. 02
Veil-piercing theory has occasionally been used in workers' com-
pensation cases for purposes other than imposing personal liability on
a shareholder for a corporate debt. In these cases, the courts pierce the
veil as a means of treating one company as the "employer" of a worker
that is formally employed by someone else.'0 Most courts find it un-
necessary to take this approach, however, as the jurisprudence in the
workers' compensation field is flexible enough to find "statutory em-
ployers" outside of formal employment relationships. Where veil-piercing
is discussed at all, it tends to be treated rather summarily, as a secondary
question, and tends to be decided in a way that is consistent with the
court's view on the main issue being posed, namely, the treatment of
98. Withers v. Timber Products, Inc., 574 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 580 So. 2d 378 (1991); McGregor v. United Film Corp., 351 So. 2d 1224 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1977), writ denied, 353 So. 2d 1335, 1341 (1978); Lushute v. Diesi, 343
So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 354 So. 2d 179 (1977); McClendon
v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 340 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Cole v.
Golemi, 271 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Brown v. Benton Creosoting Co., 147 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1962).
99. Withers, 574 So. 2d at 1291; Brown, 147 So. 2d at 89.
100. Cole v. Golemi, 271 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
101. Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) (employee's insurance
policy providing $25.00 per week for 100 weeks).
102. Lushute v. Diesi, 343 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
354 So. 2d 179 (1977).
103. McGregor v. United Film Corp., 351 So. 2d 1224 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), writ
denied, 353 So. 2d 1335, 1341 (1978) (joint employers); Brown v. Benton Creosoting Co.,
147 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) (major creditor that had taken over management,
and received most the economic benefit of the business operation treated as employer as
result of piercing).
[Vol. 52
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
a particular person or company as a "statutory employer."' ' The courts
have done here what they ought to do in most veil-piercing cases: they
have seen the true policy issues being posed, and have refused to be
distracted by abstract questions of corporate separateness.
In an interesting twist on this "statutory employer" problem, a
parent corporation in Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Service, Inc.'05 sought to
pierce its own subsidiary's corporate veil in order to give the subsidiary
access to the parent company's status as a statutory employer. The
parent corporation in Cotton's Fleet owned all of the stock of two
different corporations, one of which employed a driver injured on the
job in an automobile accident, and the other of which owned and
supplied an allegedly defective truck being driven by the worker at the
time of his accident. The employee collected his workers' compensation
benefits under the insurance maintained by the parent company, but
also sought to recover from the truck-owning subsidiary under tort law.
The supreme court held in Cotton's Fleet that the truck-owning
subsidiary was not entitled to the tort immunity of a statutory employer,
and that, as far as the injured employee of the other corporation was
concerned, it may as well have been an unrelated third party tortfeasor. 06
The court rejected the defendant's veil-piercing argument, choosing to
treat the sibling corporation, wholly owned by the principal/statutory
employer, as if it were a separate "contractor"-as if the fact that the
contractor and principal were nothing but separately incorporated di-
visions of the same business enterprise had no legal relevance. 107 The
court insisted on respecting the separate identities of the corporations
involved, except to the extent that one could be treated as a statutory
employer under workers' compensation law. Veil-piercing, as such, was
not allowed.
Ironically, this is one case in which the policies of corporation law
would have been better served by disregarding, not respecting, the sep-
arate existence of the corporations involved. By respecting the corpor-
ation's separate identity-despite the wishes of the shareholders not to
do so-the supreme court decision in Cotton's Fleet used the corporate
fiction to increase, rather than to reduce, the risks posed to shareholders
in operating this separately-incorporated aspect of the overall business
enterprise. Had the trucks and other assets of-the "contractor" subsidiary
104. E.g., Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Service, Inc., 500 So. 2d 759 (La. 1987); Cormier
v. Guilbeaux, 547 So. 2d 17 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 633 (1989);
Certain v. Equitable Equip. Co. 453 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 459
So. 2d 535, reconsid. denied, 461 So. 2d 304 (1984); Cole v. Golemi, 271 So. 2d 65 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1972).
105. 500 So. 2d 759 (La. 1987).
106. Id. at 761.
107. Id. at 760-63.
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been owned directly by the parent corporation in Cotton's Fleet, workers'
compensation law would have protected those assets against the tort
claims of the employee. The court chose to lift that protection for the
simple reason that the parent company had chosen to place those nor-
mally protected assets in a separate subsidiary. The court did argue,
correctly, that separate incorporation might sometimes, in a hypothetical
case, be used to avoid liability for legal obligations that might otherwise
be owed, 08 but it never suggested that anything of the kind had actually
occurred in the case before it. The parent corporation in Cotton's Fleet
thus lost part of its tort immunity for no better reason than having
held some of its assets in. the wrong sort of way. Moreover, an employee
who received exactly what he was supposed to under the workers'
compensation system was given a windfall recovery because of hypo-
thetical claims that might have been asserted by other persons, in very
different circumstances, where entirely different principles of law should
have been controlling.
The Cotton's Fleet court did not see that separate incorporation
might be used for a variety of legitimate reasons having nothing to do
with an effort to circumvent an employer's workers' compensation ob-
ligations: to facilitate tax planning, to accommodate creditors who are
financing that particular part of the overall business, or even to limit
the parent company's risks to other creditors in. connection with the
separate subsidiary's operations. Cotton's Fleet therefore discourages
business arrangements that might otherwise make perfectly good sense,
without increasing one whit the workers' compensation benefits enjoyed
by the parent company's workers. By relying on the corporate fiction
itself, without any analysis of the reasons for which the fiction is
normally recognized, the Cotton's Fleet decision has created an unnec-
essary dilemma for business planners: they must give up either the normal
benefits of separate incorporation or the normal benefits of tort immunity
under workers' compensation law.
CIRCUMVENTION CASES
Cases in the "circumvention" category of veil-piercing jurisprudence
are strikingly different from any of the cases discussed so far; they have
nothing whatever to do with the collection of a debt owed by the
corporation. Rather, in the circumvention type of case the court is being
108. If the parent company had become insolvent, the separate incorporation would
effectively have subordinated the worker's claim against the assets of the subsidiary to
the debts owed by the subsidiary to its own, separate creditors; the employee would have
an interest only as a creditor of the parent company, and the parent company's interest
as the 1000%c shareholder would have been junior in right of payment to the claims of
the subsidiary's creditors.
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asked to disregard the separate existence of a corporation in order to
prevent the shareholder of the corporation from getting around some
restriction on his own freedom of action. The veil is pierced in these
cases to stop the shareholder from doing indirectly through a corporation
what he could not do directly as an individual, or viewed in a slightly
different way, to impute to a corporation some legal disability or char-
acteristic that, as a formal matter, is actually held by the shareholder
rather than by the corporation itself. Thus, the circumvention cases do
not involve issues of corporation law, as such. Rather, they raise ques-
tions about the proper interpretation of a particular statute or contract,
i.e., whether the particular statute or contract in question ought to be
interpreted to reach only those actions taken by the parties directly, or
instgad ought to be seen as reaching indirect actions as well.
The leading example of this type of case is Glazer v. Commission
on Ethics for Public Employees.' 9 Glazer addressed the question whether
a member of the state's mineral board, who was legally prohibited from
selling steel to oil companies, could avoid the unlawful conflict of interest
by selling the same steel to the same companies, only indirectly-through
a wholly owned corporation. In a decision considerably better-reasoned
than most veil-piercing opinions, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
"no." The court said that insofar as the statutory prohibition against
conflicts of interest was concerned, the corporate veil could be pierced,
and transactions by the board member's wholly-owned corporation could
be treated as if they were transactions by the board member himself.
In effect, the court may be said either to have prohibited the board
member from circumventing the legal restriction on his own, direct,
business dealings through the use of a wholly-owned corporation, or to
have imputed the corporation's transactions to the shareholder for pur-
poses of determining whether the shareholder had violated the law's
prohibition of conflicts of interest on the part of board members. Either
way, the result is the same. The court was careful to point out, however,
that it was not necessarily holding that the separate identity of the board
member's corporation ought not be respected for other purposes, or
that the board member/shareholder was subject to personal liability for
the corporation's debts." '0 This decision thus explicitly acknowledged
what most veil-piercing cases miss: that the same corporation may be
subject to veil-piercing for some purposes, but not for others, even
though the veil-piercing "factors" might otherwise be identical."'
The real question in a veil-piercing case, said the Glazer court, was
how to strike the correct balance between the policies underlying the
109. 431 So. 2d 752 (La. 1983).
I10. Id. at 757-58.
III. Id. at 758.
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law's normal respect for the separate personality of a corporation (e.g.,
to encourage business investment) and those supporting the disregarding
of that separate personality under the circumstances of that particular
case. In this case, the court reasoned, the recognition of the separate
personality of the corporation would thwart the legislative policy un-
derlying the statutory prohibition of conflicts of interest on the part of
public employees, without furthering in any way the positive goals sought
to be advanced by the law's normal respect for the separate personality,
e.g., limited liability for shareholders. Thus, it was appropriate to pierce
the veil.
A later first circuit court of appeal case extended the Glazer ruling
to pierce the veil of a corporation wholly owned by the children, and
later by the siblings, of the public employee. It too recognized that the
corporate veil may be pierced for some purposes, even though the same
corporation's separate existence would be recognized for other pur-
poses." 2
There are several types of cases outside the ethics field that involve
the "circumvention" or "imputing" issue, and, for the most part, courts
are considerably more liberal in piercing the veil in these cases than
they are in the limited liability type of case discussed earlier in this
article. Courts have pierced the veil in the following types of cases:
1. Where a seller of a business, having entered into a non-
compete agreement, has engaged in a competing business through
a corporation that he owns or effectively controls. The courts
in these cases will enjoin the competition through the controlled
corporation." 3
2. Where a common carrier attempts to circumvent some of
the legal requirements applicable to it, or to avoid legal res-
trictions on its own actions, through the use of subsidiaries or
affiliates; the companies have not been successful." 4
3. Where an affiliate company was used in an attempt to avoid
112. In re Sea Shell, Inc., 509 So. 2d 90 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1987).
113. See Desselle v. Petrossi, 207 So. 2d 190 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 209
So. 2d 39 (1968); Hirsh v. Miller, 181 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), rev'd on
other grounds, veil-piercing questioned, 187 So. 2d 709 (1966); Hirsh v. Miller, 167 So.
2d 539 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 168 So. 2d 821 (1964); S&R Gas Co. v. Stephens,
90 So. 2d 487 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956), judgment annulled and case dismissed as moot,
99 So. 2d 5 (1958).
114. Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. La. Public Serv. Comm'n, 349 So. 2d 1262 (La.
1977); American Courier Corp. v. La. Public Serv. Comm'n, 256 La. 464, 236 So. 2d
802 (1970); But cf., Collins Pipeline Co. v. New Orleans East, Inc., 250 So. 2d 29 (La.
App. 4th Cir.) (upholding common carrier classification-and resultant expropriation power-
against argument that carrier was mere alter ego of its 80% and 20% parent corporations,
which were not themselves common carriers), writ denied, 252 So. 2d 669, 670 (1971).
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restrictions on cross-parish branch banking."'
4. Where a controlled corporation was used in an effort to
avoid a contractual obligation that purportedly existed only as
long as the obligor remained in business-the business was taken
over by a controlled corporation, so the obligor argued he was
no longer bound to perform; veil pierced and argument re-
jected."16
5. Where a foreign parent corporation has directed the internal
affairs of a subsidiary, the in-state acts of the subsidiary may
be imputed to the out-of-state parent for purposes of exercising
long-arm jurisdiction over the parent. ' 7
6. Where the parties to an unrecorded transaction affecting the
clear title to immovable property seek to avoid the effects of
the transaction by transferring the property to a purported third
party-a corporation owned by the parties themselves; in these
cases, the courts pierce the veil and treat the corporation as if
it were a party to the transaction involved, thus denying the
third party status needed to take title free of the unrecorded
interests."'
7. Where a seller has a claim for rescission on grounds of
lesion beyond moiety, but for buyer's transfer of property to
"alter ego" corporation; in these cases, rescission is permissible
despite the normal separate identity of the corporation." '9
Courts have refused to pierce the veil in "imputing/circumvention"
type cases where:
115. Whitney Nat'l Bank in Jefferson Parish v. James, 189 So. 2d 430 (La. App. Ist
Cir.), writ denied. 191 So. 2d 140 (1966).
116. Quaglino Tobacco & Candy Co. v. Barr, 519 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1987). But see, Chef's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Bull McWood, Inc.. 459 So. 2d 1371 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1984) (franchisees held not to have breached their obligation to give right
of first refusal in connection with good faith offers to buy the franchised business when
they allowed competitor of franchisor to acquire the franchised business by first causing
a corporation controlled by the franchisees to make an offer that the franchisor saw no
need to match).
117. Copeland v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 288 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 290 So. 2d 911 (1974).
118. Meraux v. R.R. Barrow, Inc., 219 La. 309, 52 So. 2d 863 (1951); Keller v. Haas,
202 La. 486, 12 So. 2d 238 (1943); Evergreen Plantation, Inc. v. Zunamon, 319 So. 2d
543 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975) (veil not pierced); Cattle Farms, Inc. v. Abercrombie, 211
So. 2d 354 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
119. Warriner v. Russo, 308 So. 2d 499, 501 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975) ("corporation,
which is alter ego of the original vendee, stands in the same position as the original
vendee in a vendor's action for lesion beyond moiety." Case remanded for factual
findings.), appeal after remand, 367 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied,
380 So. 2d 71 (1980).
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1. A garnishment order has been issued against the shareholder
of the employing corporation, rather than the employing cor-
poration itself. The result is the same-no piercing-regardless
of whether the shareholder is an individual or a parent cor-
poration, and regardless of whether the shareholder had initially
employed the subject employee, or the garnishment had been
sought against the wrong person from the outset. 2 '
2. The person seeking to disregard the separate identities of
the corporations and other persons involved has consented to
their separate treatment. 2 '
DISTINGUISHING CIRCUMVENTION CASES
It is important to recognize that the circumvention cases comprise
a distinct type of veil-piercing case, for this is the one type of case in
which it often does make sense to pierce the veil based solely on the
fact that the corporation is the "instrumentality" or "alter ego" of the
corporate shareholder, and it is in this type of case that the courts'
statements of the law are going to most favor veil-piercing based on
this simple ground alone. Keller v. Haas,' for example, contains a
passage that is widely quoted in veil-piercing cases, almost always out
of context. According to Keller,
It is well settled that where an individual forms a corporation
of which he is the sole and only stockholder or owns such
control of the stock that the act of the corporation is his own,
then he may not use the screen of corporate entity to absolve
himself from responsibility.'23
The first point to make about this statement is that it reflects an
early hostility in the law to one-person corporations, a hostility that no
longer exists. When Louisiana's corporation statute was updated some
tweny-five years after Keller was decided, the old requirement that every
corporation have at least three shareholders was repealed. There is no
longer any reason to speak, as the Keller court did, as if there were
something inherently illicit about a corporation's being controlled by
just one person. 24 It is clear under modern law that the sole ownership
120. Farrell v. Farrell, 446 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) (parent corporation,
initially the direct employer); Camp v. Gibbs, 331 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976)
(individual, never the direct employer).
121. Roy A. Schnebelen & Assoc. v. American Bank & Trust Co., 349 So. 2d 1020
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
122. 202 La. 486, 12 So. 2d 238 (1943).
123. Id. at 491, 12 So. 2d at 240.
124. See Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana Absent Fraud or Deceit,
48 La. L. Rev. 1229, 1237 (1988).
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of a corporation by one person does not provide a basis upon which
to pierce the veil of the corporation.12 1
But the more important point is that Keller was talking about piercing
the veil strictly in the context of a transfer of property by an individual
to his virtual one-person corporation, as a means of cutting off the
unrecorded rights of redemption held by his co-owners; the court was
not considering whether a creditor of the corporation could have held
the shareholder of the corporation personally liable on a corporate debt.
Similarly, in the Glazer case, no one was suggesting that the corporation
involved was not a creditworthy, well-capitalized, well-run business cor-
poration that would be sufficient to shield its sole shareholder from
personal liability for a corporate debt. Yet the fact that the corporation's
fictional personality might be respected for purposes of the limited
liability rule did not mean, and should not mean, that the fictional
personality had to be respected for all other purposes as well. The
corporations may well have been separate persons in the sense contem-
plated by the limited liability rule, yet still not be separate persons in
the senses contemplated by the public records doctrine and by the state
ethics statute, respectively.
Where a corporation really is nothing but an instrumentality of its
dominant shareholder-and that will almost always be the case in one-
owner companies' 6-it will normally not make sense'17 to interpret a
125. Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., No. 91-C-0963, (La. Dec. 2, 1991) (1991 WL
255914, 1991 LEXIS 3373); Central Business Forms, Inc. v. N-Sure Systems, Inc., 540
So. 2d 1029 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989); Chin v. Roussel, 456 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), writ denied, 459 So. 2d 540 (1984); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper, 430 So.
2d 143 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Hock v. Sea Camper of New Orleans, Inc., 419 So.
2d 1315 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1182 (1982); Peters v. Crochet
Homes, Inc., 370 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Johansen v. Port Jewell, Inc.,
351 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 4th Cir.), application not considered, 352 So. 2d 705 (1977);
Sampay v. Davis, 342 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Kingsman Enterprises, Inc.
v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d 1280 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Camp v. Gibbs, 331
So. 2d 517 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Cole v. Golemi, 271 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1972); Hughes Realty Co. v. Pfister, 245 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 25.29.
127. As usual, some exceptions to the normal rule might exist. For example, in a
contractual setting, a creditor of a one-owner corporation might well restrict the owner's
personal business activities as a means of encouraging him to carry out those activities
through the corporation, thus sharing their benefits with the creditor, and in a statutory
setting, the state might allow activity by a corporation that met certain specified require-
ments for taxation, jurisdictional, licensing, or regulatory purposes, even though the
shareholder personally might fail to meet those requirements. Unless some such explanation
can be offered for distinguishing a corporation from its sole shareholder,. however, it
seems more likely that most statutes and contracts would endeavor to reach all conduct
by an affected person, whether that conduct was carried out directly or indirectly. Where
the legislature (in the case of statutes) or contracting parties (in case of contracts) have
1991]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
statute or contract to restrict a shareholder's own personal conduct, but
not the conduct he carries out through a wholly-owned business cor-
poration. If for all practical purposes a shareholder is in complete control
of a corporation, and is in a position to enjoy substantially the same
economic participation in "corporate" transactions as he would enjoy
in direct, personal transactions, then it is difficult to see how the
personality of the corporation could be considered separate and distinct
from that of the shareholder in any sense that would be relevant to
most statutory or contractual restrictions on the shareholder's behavior-
even though the corporation's separate personality might well be re-
spected for limited liability purposes.' As the supreme court explained
in Glazer, the same corporation may have its veil pierced for some
purposes and not for others, depending on the balancing of underlying
policies. 2 9 The more liberal circumvention decisions should not be relied
upon to pierce the veil in a limited liability case, and the more con-
servative limited liability decisions should not be used to block piercing
in a circumvention case.
REVERSE OR DEFENSIVE VEIL-PIERCING
In most veil-piercing cases, it is the plaintiff that is seeking to pierce
the veil of a corporation. In a handful of cases, however, it is the
defendant who seeks to have the separate personality of his own cor-
poration disregarded. 30 Defensive veil-piercing is normally sought as a
means of imputing to the corporation some status, characteristic or
position held by the shareholder which would provide a defense to the
corporation against the plaintiff's claim. For example, as discussed
above,' 3' a parent corporation might seek to pierce the veil of its own
deliberately chosen to distinguish between a corporation and its sole shareholder, that
distinction should be given effect. Cf., Roy A. Schnebelen & Assoc. v. American Bank
& Trust Co., 349 So. 2d 1020 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977) (separate identities of two different
bank corporations respected in accordance with the understanding of the parties). But
where a contract or statute is silent on the question, and plausible reasons for such a
distinction cannot be ascertained, the failure to specify coverage of both direct and indirect
conduct is more likely to be due to inadvertence than to deliberate choice.
128. See supra note 126.
129. Glazer v. Comm'n on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 431 So. 2d 752, 757-58 (La.
1983).
130. Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Service, Inc., 500 So. 2d 759 (La. 1987); Casson v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Bonnette v. Langston,
535 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Traigle, 360 So. 2d 245
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Owens & Son v. Guastella East, Inc., 354 So. 2d 571 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1977), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1013 (1978); Afeman v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 307 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Giuffria Realty v. Kathman-Landry,
Inc., 173 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 103-108.
[Vol. 52
19911 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 317
subsidiary in order to impute to the subsidiary the parent's status as a
statutory employer, and so bar tort claims by its employees against the
subsidiary company.3 2 Occasionally, a shareholder will attempt to pierce
the veil of his own corporation not as a defense, but rather as a means
of recovering personally for a loss suffered by the corporation.' 3
Louisiana courts have generally been hostile to this "reverse" or
"defensive" form of veil-piercing-without explaining in any satisfactory
way why they ought to be. Their stated reasons tend to be of two
types, the first resembling estoppel, and the second suggesting an ap-
plication of traditional black letter theory without any apparent aware-
ness of the distinctive nature of the question being posed.
The estoppel-like theory, the one most commonly used, is illustrated
in Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Service, Inc. ,'4 where the supreme court
explained that it was difficult even to take the defendant's veil-piercing
argument seriously because
it attacks a basic policy decision of the legislature that is generally
favorable to corporate investors and which defendant without
a doubt would have defended strongly had this been a tort suit
by a third party seeking to pierce the corporate entities.'
In other words, you can't have it both ways: if you want the generally
favorable effects of a separate corporate personality, then you are free
to incorporate, but if you choose to incorporate, don't expect the courts
to let you attack your own corporate existence when it suits your purposes
to do so. The courts are not going to let you attack the very corporate
structure that you yourself established; you are estopped to deny your
own corporation's separate existence.
This reasoning is superficially appealing, but it is not consistent with
the supreme court's own announced principle that veil-piercing cases are
to be decided by reference to underlying policies in a particular case,
and not based on the rather simplistic notion that a corporation either
132. Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Service, Inc., 500 So. 2d 759 (La. 1987).
133. Hinchman v. Oubre, 445 So. 2d 1313 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984); Mahfouz v.
Ogden, 380 So. 2d 646 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1979).
134. 500 So. 2d 759 (La. 1987).
135. Id. at 763. For a similar statement by the first circuit, see Hilton Hotels Corp.
v. Traigle, 360 So. 2d 245, 246 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) ("It ill behooves Hilton to
attempt to disregard the corporateness of its own subsidiary when it is in its interest so
to do, while still obtaining whatever benefits flow from conducting business as separate
corporations."). See also Hinchman v. Oubre, 445 So. 2d 1313, 1317 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1984); Mahfouz v. Ogden, 380 So. 2d 646, 649 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (in these latter
two cases, sole shareholder Was attempting to sue individually for damages allegedly
sustained by the corporation).
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does or does not have a separate personality.13 As the court itself has
noted, the separate personality of a corporation (or of any other form
of human organization) is purely fictional; it doesn't really exist, the
law simply pretends that it exists in order to achieve certain policy
objectives. If the legislature really intended for the corporate personality
to have generally favorable effects, it seems most unlikely that the
legislature would also have intended to extract some randomly-distributed
penalties in exchange for those benefits in the rare case in which-
without violating any discernable policy other than the fictional per-
sonality itself-it happens to be to the benefit of the shareholders to
deny the corporation's separate status. Unless that denial of status
interferes with some genuine, nonfictional policy of law (e.g., to prevent
tax avoidance, to protect shareholders, creditors or others dealing with
the corporation,"' or to provide for certainty of ownership in property
law), then it is most difficult to see why a shareholder ought not be
permitted to deny his own corporation's separate status. Indeed, as
suggested earlier in the workers' compensation discussion, that sort of
defensive piercing might actually end up advancing, rather than impeding,
legislative policy. 3
Some defensive veil-piercing cases do not rely solely on the estoppel
argument. Either separately or together with that argument, these de-
cisions apply the same standards and rules in a defensive veil-piercing
case that they do in the more common type of case, as if it made
absolutely no difference that it was the defendant rather than the plaintiff
seeking to pierce the veil.' 39 Courts end up applying rules in the defensive
cases that were designed to be used in precisely the opposite type of
situation, cases in which the plaintiff was seeking to deny legal protec-
tions to defendants who had violated the legal standards imposed as a
condition to the recognition of their corporation's separate personality.
Where the plaintiff seeks piercing, it is understandable that the courts
would make their veil-piercing decisions based in part on factors such
136. The Cotton's Fleet court reaffirmed this principle even though it rejected the
defendant's reverse-piercing arguments. 500 So. 2d at 762. That was possible because the
court was convinced, contrary to the arguments presented in this text, that workers'
compensation policy was being served in that case by denying the veil-piercing. Id. Although
the court's conclusion on this issue seems wrong, it did focus on the real question. It is
unfortunate that its opinion included the "estoppel" observation quoted in the text, for
that language was not consistent with the general tenor of the court's argument.
137. In the case of shareholders seeking to pierce as a means of recovering personally
for corporate claims, the reverse piercing would allow the shareholder to circumvent the
rights of creditors and other shareholders. This type of reverse piercing should normally
not be allowed.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
139. See Casson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989);
Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Traigle, 360 So. 2d 245 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1978).
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as the commingling of personal and corporate funds. But where it is
the defendant seeking to disregard his own corporation's separate per-
sonality, it seems nonsensical to suggest that the same tests should be
applied. A standard application of the normal rules would result in a
court's denying benefits sought by a defendant who had managed his
corporation lawfully and honestly, and granting such protections where
piercing was "justified" by commingling and other forms of managerial
chicanery. Under this approach, the defendant would be better off
violating the law than following it.
As always, the central question in these cases ought not be "does"
a corporation "really" exist-for certainly it does not exist except as a
legal fiction. Instead, courts should consider whether, based on a bal-
ancing of the legal policies involved, the recognition of a corporation's
separate personality over the objections of the corporation's shareholders
really does serve, rather than frustrate, the purposes for which the
corporate fiction is normally recognized. Where shareholders are seeking
a personal recovery on a claim that should be shared through the
corporation with creditors and other shareholders, reverse piercing should
not be allowed. But where the fictional personality of the corporation
is being used by the other party in the case to circumvent some defense
that should normally be available, courts should not be any less inclined
to pierce the veil as a means of blocking this effort at circumvention
just because it is the shareholder seeking the piercing rather than some
other party.
Courts have denied defensive or reverse veil-piercing where it has
been sought to achieve the following effects:
1. To impute a parent corporation's statutory employer status
to a subsidiary;"1
2. To avoid sales tax on transactions between parent and sub-
sidiary; 4 1'
3. To permit a professional corporation to claim coverage under
a malpractice settlement agreement to which its shareholder/
physician was a party; 4 2 and
4. To permit a shareholder to recover personally for losses
suffered by his corporation."3
140. Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Service, Inc., 500 So. 2d 759 (La. 1987).
141. Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. State Department of Revenue, 588 So. 2d 356
(La. 1991); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Traigle, 360 So. 2d 245 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
But see United Companies Printing Co. v. Baton Rouge, 569 So. 2d 186 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 73 (1991) (intercompany transfers not treated as
"sales" for tax purposes); Cajun Contractors, Inc. v. State Dept. of Revenue, 515 So.
2d 625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
142. Casson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
143. E.g., State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Clark, 548 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 2d
1991)
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One case has permitted reverse piercing as a means of creating
consideration for a contract with the corporation, though the veil-piercing
seemed unnecessary to the result in the case.'"
OTHER TYPES OF VEIL-PIERCING
As indicated at the outset of this article, the separate personality
of a corporation serves a variety of different functions, and so may be
respected, or disregarded, to achieve a variety of different policy ob-
jectives. 45 Most of the reported veil-piercing cases in Louisiana fit into
one of the categories already discussed, but there are several other
decisions that do not fall into any of these categories, and so are noted
in this section of essentially "miscellaneous" types of cases.
The single most common sort of miscellaneous case involves ques-
tions about the ownership of property. Occasiofially, despite the fact
that a corporation has been named in some transaction as the owner
of a particular item of property, the shareholders or other participants
in the incorporated organization will seek to say that the property
involved, though titled in the corporation's name, is "really" owned by
some other person. 4 Courts are hostile to such claims, probably due
to the importance of certainty of ownership in facilitating property
transactions. Related to these property ownership cases, but more as-
sociated with civil procedure, are the "claim" ownership cases. In these
cases the courts consider whether to allow corporate claims to be enforced
by shareholders acting for themselves, rather than as agents of the
corporation. In general, the answer has been "no.""' 7
Cir.), writ 'denied, 552 So. 2d 395 (1989); Hinchman v. Oubre, 445 So. 2d 1313 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1984); Mahfouz v. Ogden, 380 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979);
Afeman v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 307 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975). These
cases do not involve a defensive use of veil-piercing, for it is the plaintiff rather than
the defendant seeking to have the corporation disregarded, but they do involve "reverse"
piercing in the sense that it is the shareholder of the corporation seeking to disregard his
own corporation's separate personality, and not a third party trying to pierce the veil
over the objection of shareholders. But cf., Coury v. Coury Moss, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1316
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (veil pierced to allow shareholder to bring suit personally for
wrongs suffered by corporation as result of alleged managerial misconduct), disagreed
with by Bordelon v. Cochrane, 533 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), writ denied, 531
So. 2d 1255 (1989).
144. Giuffria Realty, Inc. v. Kathman-Landry, Inc., 173 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
146. Cohn v. Heymann, 544 So. 2d 1242 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 548 So.
2d 1233 (1989); G.l.'s Club of Slidell v. American Legion Post 374, 504 So. 2d 967 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1987); Union Local P-1476 of Amalgamated Meatcutters v. Union Citizens
Club of Terrebonne Parish, 408 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
147. E.g., TransGlobal Alloy 'Limited v. First Nat'l Bank of Jefferson Parish, 564
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Also in the procedure area, one Louisiana case has used a veil-
piercing theory as a means of avoiding the requirement that shareholders
seeking to enforce corporate claims for breaches of fiduciary duty bring
such actions as derivative lawsuits.'"4 Another panel of the same circuit,
however, has declined to follow that decision. 49 Another decision has
permitted veil-piercing as a means of asserting personal jurisdiction over
a foreign parent corporation based on a subsidiary company's connec-
tions with the state of Louisiana.150
CONCLUSION
The factors that truly are important in veil-piercing decisions vary
from case to case, depending on the nature of the issues being posed.
In pure circumvention cases, the mere fact that the corporation is an
alter ego or instrumentality will normally be enough to disregard the
corporation's fictional personality, even if the company is well-run and
financially sound. In contrast, in limited liability cases, alter ego status
by itself will almost never result in veil-piercing; if it did, few small
business owners would enjoy limited liability. In these cases, courts tend
to concentrate on financial misdealifigs that result in confusion between
the assets that belong to the shareholder personally, and those that
should lawfully belong to the corporation. Inadequate capitalization and
insurance are also relevant in limited liability cases, but are much more
important in tort cases than in those involving contractual claims, as
the contractual creditor will have been capable of negotiating about the
credit risks involved. Indeed, in cases of contractual claimants, the single
most common form of reported veil-piercing case in Louisiana, the
courts consistently limit veil-piercing to those situations in which the
corporation's financial status is highly complicated or confused, or in
which the contracting creditor has been misled in some way, or could
not reasonably have been expected to understand the risk he was taking
in extending credit to the corporation.
So. 2d 697 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). rev. on other grounds, 583 So. 2d 443 (1991);
State, Dept. of Transp. v. Clark, 548 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 552
So. 2d 395 (1989); Hinchman v. Oubre, 445 So. 2d 1313 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984);
Mahfouz v. Ogden, 380 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Afeman v. Insurance Co.
of N. Am., 307 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975). But cf., Coury v. Coury Moss,
Inc., 510 So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (veil pierced to allow shareholder to bring
suit personally for wrongs suffered by corporation as result of alleged managerial mis-
conduct), disagreed with by Bordelon v. Cochrane, 533 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1988), writ denied, 536 So. 2d 1255 (1989).
148. Coury v. Coury Moss, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
149: Bordelon v. Cochrane, 533 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536
So. 2d 1255 (1989).
150. Copeland v. Gordon Jewelry, 288 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
290 So. 2d 911 (1974).
1991]
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Undoubtedly, veil-piercing law would make a great deal more sense
if courts stopped denying the obvious, that one-owner corporations are
almost always instrumentalities of their owners, and if they justified
their veil-piercing decisions more honestly, on other grounds. But it
seems unlikely that the time-honored traditions of veil-piercing law are
going to be abandoned anytime soon. Judges have no particular incentive
to throw away a doctrine that essentially says "you can do whatever
you think is fair as long as you recite a standardized set of lines."
For the practicing lawyer, therefore, the Louisiana jurisprudence on
veil-piercing actually presents itself on two levels: the functional, policy-
oriented effects of the decisions involved, and the black letter doctrine
that the courts recite in support of their decisions. A good working
knowledge of the Louisiana law of veil-piercing thus requires some
familiarity with the law on both of these levels, function and doctrine,
for while most courts will insist on the recitation of doctrine, the results
they reach suggest that they are sensitive to policy and function as
well. '
151. Of course, even apart from considerations of courtroom advocacy, it is important
for a practitioner to understand the context, limits and uses of veil-piercing doctrine in
business planning, for considerations of this kind could influence his decisions about the
way in which a given business transaction should be structured in the first place, in order
to minimize veil-piercing risks.
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